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Abstract
This study investigates:
(1) the conception and characteristics of the legal system of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in
order to highlight the extent to which intellectuals can be legally protected. It also shows:
(1) the reform and continuity
of the legal system under Deng; (2) why there exists a phenomenon
criminal liability of intellectuals in Communist China for counterrevolutionary crime being much higher in degree than that of
the workers and peasants, especially under Mao; (3) the sources
criminal responsibility of intellectuals; (4) why the degree of
criminal responsibility of intellectuals varies under the leadership of Mao and Deng respectively; and (5) the limitations and
prosepcts for the legal system under Deng to offer legal protection to intellectuals so as to reduce their criminal responsibility. The ultimate purpose of the study is to search for
ways to improve the socialist legal system in light of the fact
that the degree of criminal responsibility of intellectuals illuminates the defects and shortcomings of the legal system under
Mao and Deng.
This study, mainly based on the analysis of relevant documents, information and materials, is a comparative study from a
political perspective.
It compares the basic conception of the
legal system under Mao and Deng; their attitude and policies
towards intellectuals; their responses to the intellectuals' demands for freedom and democratization, as well as justice in the
application of law in handling these cases.
Using· a political
approach implies that the focus is on the role of politics in
influencing the organization and practices of the legal system in
Communist China.
Although the time period covered in the study is ·from 1949
to 1982, indeed the period of the Cultural Revolution. is excluded
since at that time the legal system was completely destroyed,
1982 was a crucial year in Communist China which marked a milestone in the political and legal developments in the People's
Republic of China since two important Constitutions were born -the Constitution of the Communist Party of China and the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.
It is on these two
documents that the principle of the supremacy of law is
confirmed.
The cases chosen for comparison are the •au Feng incident•
(1954-55), the •blooming• and •contending• and the •AntiRightist• campaigns (1957) in Mao's era on one hand, and the
Beijing Spring Democratic Movement (1979) on the other hand.
These incidents are linked by the fact that all the victims were
intellectuals. The comparison is aimed at illustrating the degree of criminal responsibility of intellectuals within the legal
frameworks of Mao and Deng.
The study concludes that the legal system, either und~r Mao
or Deng, is chiefly a tool for achieving the Party goals as de-'
fined by the Party leaders.
Indeed, Communist ideology, as
- v -

interpreted by Mao and Deng, determined the wor~ing principles of
the legal system, as well as the Party attitude and policies towards intellectuals. This in turn dictates the degree of legal
protection for intellectuals. The legal system under Deng (which
is characterized as a "procedural justice system") is superior to
that under Mao (which is characterized as a "revolutionary
justice system"). This is true not only in the sense that the
former can offer certain legal protection to the intellectuals,
but also in that the pursuit of procedural justice marks an end
to the revolutionary era, and that the system is evolutionary in
nature on the basis of socialist democracy. In short, this study
demonstrates that the criminal responsibility of intellectuals is
a function of: (1) the degree of the monolithic rule demanded by
the Party leader 1 and (2) the legal protection that can be offered by the legal system. Finally, in assessing the limitations
and the prospects for socialist rule of law under Deng, one must
not neglect the inherent dictatorial and anti-democratic tendencies of Communist ideology.
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Introduction
Two correlated political phenomena in Communist China motivated this study.
First, in Communist China, the social and
political order has been in constant chaos. Stability, which is
the pre-condition for socialist construction, is rare.
Indeed,
since the establishment of the Communist regime, economic
development has been emphasized, the goal of which is to •transform the country from an agricultural to an industrial one. •1
Yet political struggles and movements have been the order of the
day until late 1978 when Deng Xiaoping resumed leadership. The
suppression of counterrevolutionaries, land reform movement,
"three-anti• and "five-anti,• liquidation of counterrevolutionary
movement, Anti-Rightist campaign, •tour-cleans• movement and Cultural Revolution have all disrupted stability. These political
phenomena. raise quest ions about the role of the legal system
which has long been the institution for maintaining order. The
principle targets of these movements were claimed to be •reactionaries.•
The Chinese Communist leaders like Mao Zedong
reasserted the vitality of a sound legal system and stressed the
observance of law,2 yet social and political conflicts have seldom, if ever, been resolved through the legal means. Throughout
the Maoist era, a well-established legal system never did come
into being; what existed was totally destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.3
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China {CPC) is a point of demarcation
in legal development in Communist China.
The program for the
reconstruction and the modernization of the country after ten
years of turmoil as embodied in the Communique promulgated on
that occasion is claimed to rest on the basis of a sound
socialist legal system and an internal environment of stability
and unity. Never have the Chinese Communists openly affirmed the
value of the legal system and social order in the past three decades of Communist rule. With the rise and the consolidation of
the power of the pragmatic leaders under Deng, they have voiced
the resolution to restore and strengthen the legal system.
In
fact, the Communique formally put an end to the past controversy
over the line of development and the role of the socialist legal
system. It is both fruitful and significant to compare the legal
conceptions of the Party leaders in these two distinct periods to
highlight just how far the legal system in the new era has to go
to perform the functions of resolving conflicts and preserving
order.
Second, although the Communist leaders have stressed the
indispensable role played by the intellectuals in socialist revolution and construction, since 1954 onwards the intellectuals
have constantly suffered from struggles, humiliation and persecution. They have been labelled as "reactionaries, • •r ightists, •
and even •counterrevolutionaries• durinq the Bu Feng incident,
the Anti-Rightist campaign, as well as the Cultural Revolution.
Moreover, they were not only unable to enjoy the rights and freedoms as provided by the Constitutions, but their exercise of
these rights and freedoms has been the source of their criminal
- 1 -

responsibility. The legal sy"stem has been a complete failure in
offering any protection to the intellectuals. This phenomenon
has been moderated since late 1978 with Deng's reassertion of the
positive contributions of the intellectuals. But the arrest and
trial of the "dissidents" and criticism on the intellectuals persists. This study will thus delve into the question of why intellectuals have been criminally responsible for their seemingly
legal actions.
These two political phenomena are correlated in the sense
that if the legal system can offer legal protection to the intellectuals, their criminal responsibility can be greatly reduced.
Yet this depends highly on the conception of the legal system of
Mao and Deng, as well as their attitude and policy towards the
intellectuals.
Purposes of the Study
The orientation of the study is basically a comparative one:
1.
To compare the conception and characteristics of the
legal system of Mao and Deng in order to highlight the extent to
which the intellectuals can be protected. This also shows how
far the legal system under Deng has been improved.

2.
To study why there exists the phenomenon of greater
criminal responsibility of intellectuals in Communist China for
counterrevolutionary crimes over that of the workers and
peasants, especially under Mao.
3. To establish the sources of criminal responsibility for
intellectuals.
4. To study the reasons why the degree of criminal responsibility of intellectuals varied under the leadership of Mao and
Deng.

s. To enumerate the limitations and prospects for the legal
system under Deng to offer legal protection to the intellectuals
so as to reduce their criminal responsibility.
In short, the degree of criminal responsibility of the intellectuals shows the defects and shortcomings of the socialist
legal system under Mao and Deng. Thus the ultimate purpose of
the study is to search for ways to improve the socialist legal
system.
~e

Significance of tbe Study

The significance of the study is fourfold:
1. There are few book length studies of China's legal system from Mao to Deng.
Recently, Chiu and Leng, and Amnesty
International published two insightful studies.
These aside,
most of the studies in the field are out-of-date. Recently, for
example, Brady wrote a fairly comprehensive work, but it covered
- 2 -

the period only up to 1979, the time when Deng had just assumed
power and his conception of legal system was just put into effect.S Thus, an in depth study of the legal system from Mao to
Deng may provide a positive contribution, especially from a comparative perspective.
2. Most studies are historical and socialogical ratner than
analytical, and lean away from legal analysis. Few touch on the
legal frame of Deng comprehensively. Brady is the one among the
few, yet his study is mostly from an historian-sociologist's perspective. Moreover, he has not explored Deng's conception of a
legal system in adequate depth.
3. Most scholarly works are historical case studies. The
case study in this article is a comparative analysis of cases
that were.handled under the legal framework of Mao and Deng. The
cases are compared in terms of concepts, which illustrate their
different conceptions of legality with concrete examples.
4.
Few have mentioned the criminal responsibility of the
intellectuals and used this as the point of departure to demonstrate the merits and demerits of the legal system between Mao
and Deng as well as the defects of the legal system.
As a whole, these comparisons further discussion in the improvements Deng has made as well as the problems and prospects in
the perfection of the legal system in Communist China.
Limitations of tbe Study
There are clear limitations of this study. First of all,
due to the author's lack of training in law, this study of the
legal system might seem superficial in the eyes of professionals
in legal studies. Rather than employing a legal approach, this
author wrote from a political perspective.
Second, since the
cases are compared in terms of concepts of freedom, democratization and justice, an instrinsic difficulty lies in how to expose
and compare the defects and strengths of the legal frameworks of
Mao and Deng with regard to these concepts. This is by no means
an easy task.
Source and tbe Organization of the Study
This study is based on relevant reports in primary sources,
including documents, Renmin Ribao, Beijing Review, and Honggi,
and law-related periodicals of the People's Republic of China
(PRC), such as Minzhu yu Fazhi (Democracy and Legal System),
Faxue zazhi (Legal Studies) and Faxue Yanjiu (Studies in Law).
It is mainly a comparative study from a political perspective.
The organization of the study is as follows:
Chapter One discusses the legal system and the crimina!
responsiblity of intellectuals within the single Communist Party
regime. This includes a comparison of the legal conceptions of

- 3 -

Mao and Deng as well as the sources of criminal responsibility of
intellectuals and their relationship with the legal system.
Chapter Two carves out the different characteristics of legal systems under Mao and Deng in order to show the reforms and
continuities in legal practices under Deng. In fact, legal practices have a direct impact on the criminal responsibility of intellectuals, especially in the application of law. This in turn
reflects the defects of the legal system.
Chapter Three is a study of Mao's attitude and
cies towards intellectuals. A study of the legal
wards the intellectuals would be lacking without any
the Communist leaders' attitudes and policies
intellectuals.

Deng's polipolicies toknowledge of
towards the

Chapter Four and Five are comparative case studies which
form the core of this study. They attempt to verify the above
analyses through concrete examples.
Chapter Six is a discussion of the limitations and prospects
for the institutionalization of the legal system and democratization of the political system under Deng. These two are related
since it is said that the perfect socialist legal system would be
the socialist rule of law on the basis of a socialist democracy.
Moreover, the degree of democratization determines to what extent
the legal·system can offer legal protection to the intellectuals.

- 4 -
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Chapter One
Conception of the Legal System and the Sources of Criminal
Responsibility of the Intellectuals: The case of China
The Chinese Communists, from the very beginning of their
rule in China, denied the Western conception of the legal system
which is based on a "rule of law.•l From their point of view the
Communist system should have its own legal framework.
In the
early years of the Communist regime, then President Liu Shaoqi
adopted the structural components of the Soviet legal system.
Mao Tse-tung inherited the legal philosophy and practices of the
Soviet Union along his lines of revolutionary ideology. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping's conception of a legal system is a combination of political experience combined with the consideration of
the objective condition and the need of Communist China to be
built on the line of institutionalization of judicial procedures.
In fact, his conception of the essence of the legal system is by
no means the same as the Soviet Union's. He insisted:
We should learn from foreign countries and
draw on their experiences.
But mechanical
copying and application of foreign experience
and models will get us nowhere.
• • To
integrate the universal truth of Marxism with
the concrete realities of China, blaze a path
of our own and build socialism with Chinese
characteristics • • • • 2
A continuity of Liu 's line on legal justice changed with
Deng's assertion that the legal system of Communist China must be
"Chinese" rather than "Soviet." Indeed Deng was a hardcore member of Liu 's faction, if it ever existed as asserted by the
Maoists.
In fact, both Mao and Deng manipulated the legal system as
an instrument in the pursuit of their goals.
Though it is
superficial to say that the ultimate goal of the two is the same
-- Communist society -- yet this is only the case ideologically.
From another dimension, if only intermediate goals are taken into
consideration, differences between them can be identified. For
Mao, the legal system was only useful and could serve as an instrument if it facilitated the promotion of his own conception of
justice. He would not hesitate to put aside the law whenever it
constituted an obstacle to "class struggle.• But it is just the
opposite for Deng. He treats the legal system and law as indispensable instruments which in all circumstances can facilitate
the achievement of his goals. This is mainly because their conception of legal systems were based on different premises and
ideological considerations, as well as their perception of the
objective political environment.
Indeed, ever since the establishment of the PRC, many have
characterized the political system a a monolithic party rule or
"party supremacy. • Within such a ruling framework, the essence
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and nature of the legal system has been inevitably affected by
the line of political development adopted by the top Party
leaders.
The political system under Mao de-emphasized institutionalization.
In Mao's conception, it was to be a moral unit in
which equality and human potentiali-ty were the central values.
Since Mao had faith in the human potential of becoming good
through education, it was a process to internalize Mao's conception of new Communist morals and ethical values. As a result, he
did not emphasize formal law within its institutionalized legal
structure. To some extent, this was due to his distrust of intellectuals or "experts." Since "politics in command" was the
basic characteristic of the single party Communist system, it was
a closed system under Mao's directive.
Since the demise of Mao and the rise of Deng in late 1978,
the Communist system has been evolving towads bureaucratization.
After decades of political chaos, what Deng looks for is political stability and social unity for socialist modernization. The
regime stresses pragmatism which presupposes rationality and efficiency, and this tends to accelerate the process of routinization and depolitization, as well as to raise demands for participation in the political system.
Thus the political system
under Deng has tended to be an open system in which democracy has
begun to acquire value. The legal system is to develop along the
line of institutionalization since it is treated as playing an
indispensable role in maintaining order.
Based on these premises, the concept of legality in Mao's
and Deng's eras, as well as the sources of the criminal responsibility of Chinese intellectuals will be discussed.
In fact,
the former has a direct impact on the latter.
A.

The Communist Conception of Legality:

Mao versus Deng

In the legal realm, the Communists believe in the existence
of "correct" justice.
For the Chinese Communists, substantive
justice is "proletarian" justice3 which possesses a strong class
nature and should be the justice for all in the advent of the
Communist society.
Basically, the top leaders in the CPC agree on the notion of
substantive justice for the socialist and Communist society. Yet
there have been disagreements about how to achieve it. Mao subscribed to the "mass line" whereas Liu Shaoqi and later Deng were
inclined to promote justice through an institutional framework.
One may characterize the two trends as "revolutionary justice"
and "procedural justice• respectively.
1.

Mao's Conception of the Legal System

The Communists believe that law will be abolished following
the withering away of the State. Having adopted the viewpoint of
Marx, Lenin confirmed the instrumental function of law as an instrument of suppression and class rule, a system of sanctions
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designed to safeguard the fundamental principles of class rule
and the particular interests of the ruling class.4 Mao basically
inherited the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of law. Thus law
for him was just for the purpose of consolidating Communist rule,
and eliminating enemies of the revolution as well as attaining
the development of a Communist society.
Finally, law in all
cases had to give way to politics. Politics for Mao was just the
struggle of class against class.S In this regard, Cohen has already pointed out the overriding influence of Communist ideology
on Mao's conception of legal system.6
Following Marxism-Leninism, Mao asserted that class struggle
was still to be carried on or even intensified during the period
of socialist construction or transition.? Thus, in his mind the
dictatorship of the ~roletariat was established on the basis for
class confrontation.
So Mao, in most cases agreed with Lenin
that:
The dictatorship of the proletariat, that is,
the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of
suppressing the oppressors.
• The dictatorship of proletariat imposes a series of
reconstructions on the freedom of the oppressor, the exploiters, and the capitalists. We
must suppress them in order to free humanity
from wage slavery, their resistence must be
crushed by Force.
It is clear that where
there is no~edom, let alone democracy,
where there is suppression and where there is
violence 19
and
Briefly: the dictatorship of the proletariat
is the rule -- unrestricted by law based on
force -- of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule enjoying the sympathy and support of the laboring and exploited masses.lO
Under the belief that "suppression" and "violence" were regarded as necessary and were the essence of dictatorship, revolutionary justice was discriminated against classes other than the
working class and the peasantry, or in Mao's terms, those being
excluded from the club of "people." Communist law under Mao had
neither objectivity nor universality.
Thus relentless violent
struggles and purges against "enemies" were confirmed. Law was
implemented not so much by judicial bodies, but chiefly by mass
participation in the form of political campaigns and mass movements. In fact, the revolutionary society denied pure legal order, justice and law must be considered under a larger framework
of politics and ideology.ll Mao just took "law as politics" and
wanted justice to be an active revolutionary force.
To Mao, class struggle and "politics in command" were the
order of the day under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The
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struggle was not only limited to physical elimination, it was
also to take place in the domain of thought, that is, the ideologies. This was especially obvious from 1954 onward when most of
the overt "enemies" had been eliminated since Mao had emphasized
ideological purity:
Our country is a great socialist country under
the dictatorship of the proletariat • • • •
We need
a
united
thought,
revolutionary
thought, correct thought, that is, Mao Zedong
thought. Only under this ideology can we promote our energetic revolutionary spirit and
firm, correct political direction.l2
In fact, the essence of politics in command was "Mao Zedong
thought in command.•l3 In Mao's conception, everything was to be
subordinated to politics, be the issue economic, military or culture. Since Mao felt that Communist revolution was not subject
to legally binding or judicial regulations,l4 a sense of legality
is lacking in Mao's ideology -- those who wield supreme political
power are not bound by legal norms.lS Under Mao's leadership,
the legal system was only a coercive instrument for the promotion
of revolutionary justice. "The law is the so-called state ideology, which the ruling class enforces by the use of arms. Laws,
like the state, are merely tools that protect the interests of a
given ruling class.•l6
Accordingly, Mao endorsed the class
character of law and its subordination to political dictates.
Law, in Mao's view, was the totality of the rule of conducts
reflecting the will of the Party leadership and it was enforced
by the coercive power of state to ensure the development of a
desirable social outlook.
"Law is nothing but the manifestation
of the Party leadership. •
As a whole, the legal system was
designed for political expediency.
Mao's extremely low assessment of the importance and utility of law or even a contempt for
the law during the Cultural Revolution highlights this point.l7
The chief source of legitimacy and guidance in the revolutionary
judicial system was not so much from law but from political
ideology.
The central task of revolutionary justice in Mao's mind was
educational.
The legal system had to be oriented toward
guidance, training and discipline of the people to be loyal, and
devoted to the aims of the society as formulated by the Communist
Party.
It was used as an instrument for educating the masses
about the correct values and norms of Communist ethics of Maoist
vision.l8 Under the revolutionary judicial system, wrongdoers or
those who violated the new norms of conduct were punished not
through formal legal procedures, but through struggle and campaigns.
The standard was a political rather than a legal one
since politics overshadowed legality in Mao's ideology. In Mao's
view, words (or more precisely, ideology and thought) and deeds
can be judged as right only if they:
(1) help to unite the people of all nationalities1 (2) are beneficial to socialist transformation and socialist construction1 (3)
help to consolidate
the people's democratic dictatorship1 (4)
help to consolidate
derocratic centralism1 (5) help to strengthen the leadership of
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Communist Party; and (6) are beneficial to international social
unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world.l9
Under these six criteria, there was no distinction between
criminal and civil cases. As L.S. Tao once stated, "Hardly any
legal question is not resolved, sooner or later, into a political
or ideological question.n20
Since political expediency was the chief consideration, revolutionary justice was to be pursued under Mao's guidance since
he had always considerd himself as a social engineer. Moreover,
China remained a revolutionary society, marked by rapid, violent
social change, even after the establishment of the Communist regime. Since struggles and conflicts were common political phenomena, under these uncertain and unstable political conditions,
law would soon become outdated, and new measures and policies had
to be promptly issued to resolve conflicts and struggles. Thus
to Mao, since law was unable to meet revolutionary needs, it was
better to use his own judgment and policies as the substance of
the revolutionary justicial system. After all, Lenin stated that
"the power of proletarian dictatorship is not restricted by law."
This was the case in Mao's era.
In the final analysis, Mao's
conception of the legal system was indeed, a system of the "rule
of man" since the Party rule under Mao never relied on law but
was based on his policies and decrees.21 Law was not in an essential position in the operation of the revolutionary justice
system which was marked by a lack of a written set of laws,
simplicity and flexibility as well as mass participation.
In
fact, under the rule of Mao, the PRC operated a legal system
without a criminal code or criminal procedure code.22
2.

Deng Xiaoping's Conception of the Legal System

As early as the 1950s, Deng already held that socialist construction through a well-structured political and legal system
was the first priority of the regime rather than class struggle.
His political experiences only reinforced his ideas.
Most pragmatic leaders, especially Deng, have had bitter
political experiences due to past mass movements particularly
during the Cultural Revolution which was at times a state of complete lawlessness.
The ten years of internal instability had
taught them that the socialist legal system is the "only" powerful weapon to protect the people, to strike against the enemies
and to consolidate the people's democratic regime. They came to
realize that only with a complete set of legal codes and a sound
legal system could a country be ruled properly and developed
smoothly; otherwise political chaos and turmoil will result. At
the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng pointed out the defects
of Chinese political system.23
In order to correct past mistakes, he denounced the past practice of disregarding the law and
made clear that he intended to establish the spirit of observing
the law throughout the whole country since this tradition had not
yet taken root in the Party-state:
"We must now earnestly establish a socialist democratic system and socialist legal system.
Only then can the question be resolved. "24 Thus his conception
of the legal system is a highly institutionalized one which sets
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its base on socialist de100cracy.
Indeed he shared with Liu the
idea that it is possible to attain substantive justice through
certain institutionalized standard procedures which are applicable to all.
Since his rise to power, Deng has paid close attention to
restoring order, preventing the danger of another "Cultural Revolution," and promoting the well being of the society.
He
planned to establish and maintain long-term "political stability
and unity," to "make China a modern, powerful socialist country." 25 To pave the way for achieving these ends, Deng formally"
declared the end of class struggle which he regarded as the chief
source of social instability and an obstacle for his modernization program. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central
Committee convened in December 1978, the pragmatists already denounced the principle of "taking class struggle as the key
link.n26 Deng later repeated that °Class struggle no longer constitutes the principal contradiction after the exploiters have
been eliminated"27 and "we are opposed to intensifying the class
struggle, we do not believe that there is a capitalist class
within the Party, or that under the socialist system in which the
exploiting classes and exploiting conditions have been destroyed,
that it is still possible to create a capitalist class or other
exploiting classes. n28 Although social contradictions still exist in Chinese society, few of them belong to the realm of class
struggle.
Since class struggle and conflict are no longer the
major contradictions, the task of the country has been shifted to
socialist construction. A party member stated:
After socialist transformation was fundamentally completed, the principal contradiction
our country has had to resolve is that between
the growing material and cultural needs of the
people and the backwardness of social production.
It was imperative that the focus of
Party and government works be shifted to
socialist modernization centering on economic
construction and that the people's material
and cultural life be gradually improved by
means of an immense expansion of productive
force.29
Thus the present obJective of the Party's struggle in the
new historical period is to turn China step by step into a powerful socialist country with 100dern agriculture, industry, national
defense and science and technology and with a high level of democracy and culture.30 Yet, Deng worried 100st over the problem
that Professor Ch iu once raised:
How could the PRC administer
its 100dernization program under the past irrational, unpredictable and repressive criminal justice system?31
Under these considerations, Deng has intended to establish a
stable, predictable and secure political environment based on
unity which de-emphasized struggle and conflict but stressed legal order.
Indeed the procedural judicial system under Deng is
designed for creating and maintaining an orderly, predictable
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environment for socialist modernization. In Deng's eyes, political stability is to be built on the foundation of a sound legal
system with a formal set of laws and well established legal
procedures whereas unity is to be achieved through the promotion
of socialist democracy.
The very essence of strengthening the
legal system is that "there must be laws for the people to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be
strict and law breakers must be dealt with.n32 Equally important
is 'socialist democracy which contributes to mobilizing the people's vigorous efforts, initiative and creativity for the Four
Modernizations and serves as the cornerstone for unity.
As
stated, the Party line is that
In order to safeguard people's democracy, it
is imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy will be systemitized and written into law in such a way as to
ensure the stability, continuity and full authority of this democratic system and these
laws • • • ,33
Of the greatest significance is the inner-Party democracy which
helps to prevent the emergence of a personal dictator who would
force the whole system back to "the rule of man." Ye Jianying
concurred with Deng's idea that:
The People want to strengthen and improve China's socialist legal system. An improved legal system can effectively guarantee the people's democratic rights provided for by the
Constitution and constantly develop stability
and unity and a lively and vigorous political
situation
in
the
interest
of
socialist
construction.34
Peng Zhen, in explaining the Criminal Law, has explicitly
spelled out the ultimate aim of Deng who entrusts the fate of
Communist China to the legal system to
• protect the interests of the people
and the state, consolidate and promote the
lively political environment of stability and
unity and ensure
the smooth advance of
socialist modernization.35
The legal system pervades every aspect of society, it must be
strengthened "adequately to protect socialist democracy, to combat against enemies, to maintain revolutionary order, to consolidate the people's deiOOcratic dictatorship, to protect socialist
economic base, tp foster the development of production and to
speed up the four modernizations. n36 The immediate task of the
regime is:
• • • to improve our Constitution and laws
and ensure their strict observance and inviolability. We must turn the socialist legal
- 12 -

system into a powerful instrument for protecting the rights of the people, ensuring order
in production, work and other activities,
punishing criminals and cracking down on the
disruptive activities of class enemies.37
In order to perfect the legal system for the safe of creating a legal order, its substance, that is, law, must be enacted
in respect to every aspect of people's life. In sum, there must
be laws and regulations for all kinds of social political
economic as well as cultural activities.
Upon the approval of
seven draft laws, which is regarded as a monumental step, during
the second session of the Fifth NPC in June 1979, Peng Zhen, Director of the Commission of Legislative Affairs of NPC Standing
Committee, shared the view of his colleagues Dong Biwu and Deng
who have always been concerned over the inadequacy of laws and
the need for legislation, in declaring:
As the focus of nation's work has been shifted
to socialist modernization, China must earnestly strengthen socialist democracy and the
socialist legal system so that its 900 million
citizens will have laws to abide by and
restrain and punish those who do evil.38
In fact, under Deng's leadership a series of laws covering all
social activities have been passed by the NPC. Only with a complete set of laws can the country be ruled by law.
It is generally accepted that the law must possess the nature of stability and continuity, as well as au thor itativeness,
and only through legal procedures can the laws be amended.
Universality and impartiality in the application of law must be
guaranteed in the sense that all people are equal before the. law
which has made possible since most of the population are •people•
with the extinction of the exploited classes.
Theoretically,
then, no person would be allowed the privilege of being above the
law.
Under this new framework, law governs both the Party
leaders and Party members.
No longer is the •Party above the
law. •
All social contradictions must be resolved by law and
political campaigns and large scale political criticism are prohibited in solving social contradictions. Legal reformers also
emphasize that the law must be publicized among the mases and
party-members, and they must be educated to observe and act accod ing to the law.
Measures have been and must be taken to
strengthen the legal sense of the people in order to eliminate
the legacy of legal nihilism. Thus law is no longer treated as
seriously as an instrument for class struggle, but rather serves
as a means to maintain order, protect the people and people's
democracy, as well as a means for realizing the fruits of
modernization.39
If the revolutionary political system under Mao was characterized by •politics in command,• Deng aims to establish a Chinese political system with •1aw in command.• The socialist legal
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system under Deng has been elevated to an unprecedentedly prestigious and authoritative position in Communist China and the principle of the "supremacy of law" is confirmed: all contradictions
should be handled "in accordance with the procedures prescribed
by Constitution and Law."
Thus, procedural justice draws its
legitimacy and guidance from the Constitution and laws.
In sum,
Deng believes that a sound legal system is a sine qua non in
"protect[ing) people's democratic rights, consolidat[ing) political stability and unity, develop[ing) socialist economic construction and rais [ing) the living standards of the people. n40
It is a legal system in which law nwould not be changed because
of a change of leadership, or because of a change in the view?oint or attention of the leadership.•41
Although Deng has stressed the role of law, his conception
of socialist legal system is one appproximate to nrule by law."
The legal system is far from being a system based on the nrule of
law." Even in the sense of the 0 Socialist rule of law" which is
based on socialist democracy, the system is still backward:
Only with the completion of all kinds of law,
and at the same time, the realization of democratization
and
legalization
and
institutionalization of democracy, among which
are included the continuous improvement and
perfection of all political institutions of
the state, the managerial •system of the state,
the system of elections, supervision and recall of all levels of leading cadres. In all
these respects, there must be laws to follow,
and all must work strictly according to law,
only under these conditions can "socialist
rule of law" be possible.42
"Rule by law• is the only system in which both citizens and
rulers are subject to law,~3 whereas the "socialist rule of law"
must possess all the above conditions.
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Table I
Content

A Comparison of Two Ideal Types -- Revolutionary
Justice versus Procedural Justice*
Revolutionary Justice

Procedural Justice

1. Nature

Politicized

Depollt lc Ized

2. Structure

Simple and flexible

Bureaucratic

3. Staffing

Politically reliable
"red" cadres

Professional

4. Essence

I. Justice for 'people'
not for 'non-people'
II. De-emphasis of
procedure

I. Justice for all
II. Procedures applied to
all

Ill. Absence of a set of
legal codes
lv. Polley above law
The principle of
"Supremacy of
Law" Is denied

v. Party In leadership
Court Is only tool
vi. It Is hope through
mass participation
to cultivate the
class conscious
of the mass
Aimed at the transformation of
'non-people' to
socialist men
vii. Sanction through
social Intimation

Ill. Complete set of legal
codes
lv. Law above policy
The principle of
"SupreMacy of Law
Is attained
EMphasis on uniformity
continuity, authoritativeness of Law
v. Administered by
Independent organs
subject to law
vi. Aim at maintaining
order and social
stability
Aim at maintaining
justice

vii. Sanction through
legal bodies

viii. Hass mobilization In
the execution of
law

! •••• (to be continued) ••••
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( •••• continued •••• )
Content

Revolutionary Justice

Procedural Justice

5. Definition

There Is no differentiation
between political,
criminal and civil case

Separation of political
crime from criminal
(general) and civil
crime
Different procedures and
laws for different nature
of cases

of Crime

All are handled by the same
method and of same nature

6. Highest

-permanent revolution
the ideological and
demand become upgraded
target Is being enlarged
perfect monolithic
society

Socialist rule of law
based on socialist
democracy

].

Cyclic
(or dialectic)
but cyclic Is the common
phenomenon whereas dialectic
is an Ideal

Evolutionary

Condition

1. Revolutionary fever is
still carried on
The charismatic leader
Is still alive

Revolutionary fever is
retreated and order is
emphasized to facilitate
construction
The demise of charismatic
leader

2. Proletarian justice
cannot be applied to
all since enemies
still exist

Proletarian justice is
believed to be capable of
achieving through a
complete set of legal
procedure and law

3. Contradictions are the
dominant phenomena
and can only be
resolved by struggle

Only when there is an end
to class sturggle can the
system be perfected, that
Is, conflicts are to be
solved by legal procedure
between state and people,
Party and people, and
Party and state

Form

! .... (to be continued) ••••
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( •••• continued •••• )
Condition

Revolutionary Justice

Procedural Justice

4. Extra-legal means are
uti 1i zed such as
campaigns

Extra-legal means are
condemned

5. Enemies are always

No 'non-people' elements
exist which according
to Communist ideology
must be treated by
revolutionary methods

present and must be
reformed through the
mass line

6. Closed system in the
law making process
- Party direction
People only act and
react but no interactions

Open system in the law
making process
People are permitted to
participate in the
perfection of the
legal system

], A clear distinction
between 'people' and
'enemies'

No such distinction

8, The legal sense is
weak or simply
absent

Only possible when the
whole population
especially the cadres
have acquired a strong
legal sense

9. Political reliability

It is presupposed

is emphasized
10. Social intimation is
believed to be most
effective in forcing
one to reform and
adopt the socialist
world view

People are to be educated
by formal means of
socialization through
school and mass media

11. Revolution and struggle
are not subject to
the limitations of
legal institution or
laws which are only
tools for such
purpose

All must be worked according to law any violations
will be punished

12. It is believed humans
can be reformed
through permanent
revolution

/ •••• (to be continued) ••••
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( •••• continued •••• )
Consequences

Revolutionary Justice

Procedural Justice

1. Power Is law

1. Supremacy of law

2. Discriminative

2. Non-discrimination

3. Confusion and struggle,
mass mobilizations
are order of the day

3. Pure legal Order

Limitations
1. Only beginning

2. Ideological and
revolutionary
limitations and
legacy

3. Certain past unhealthy
working principles
remain unchanged
(see Party II)
4. The legal education of
people and the cadres
Is Inadequate
Remarks

1.

The transformation has already taken place from revolutionary
justice to procedural justice.

2.

The prototype existed during the Hao 1 s era when revolutionary
justice was the dominant system.
It existed as a competing
system.

3.

It Is characterized as 'revolutionary' because It Is not only
aimed at mass education but the transformation of those nonpeople's weltanshauung as well as those decadent elements who
formerly possess a proleterlan weltanshauung.

4.

It Is characterized as "procedural" but not "Institutionalized"
or "BureaucratIc" (as used by Brady), because It Is more appropriate a on one hand, It shows the stress on the legal procedure In handling cases prescribed by the Constitution and law1
on the other hand, "procedural" already presupposes the prerequisite of an Institutionalized or bureaucratic legal
structure.
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*Mao's ideal type of revolutionary justice was put into
practice during the Cultural Revolution, whereas Deng 's ideal
type of procedural justice is at its genesis and is still evolving. This table will contrast these two ideal types. The ideal
type simply means the orientation of development of the legal
system means the orientation of development of the legal system
under the Communist leaders. Although revolutionary justice and
procedural justice are two extreme ideal types, they both aim at
the promotion of proletarian justice.
The legal system developed along the line of procedural justice in the early years of the PRC. Because of the opposition
from Mao, procedural justice was never fully established and was
forced to co-exist with the revolutionary justice. It was completely eliminated during the Cultural Revolution. In fact, the
two were incompatible rather than complementary: the revolutionary and procedural justice systems stand in sharp ideological and
political contrast. The promulgation of Criminal Law and the Law
of Criminal Procedure in latter 1979, as well as the statutory
provisions in the 1982 Constitution for the organization of a
formal legal system, herald the end of revolutionary justice and
the final triumph of procedural justice as the "correct" way to
pursue substantive justice.
It is no doubt that Mao's model of justice was predominant
while Liu 's line of legal justice was a competing model until
late 1978 when Deng resumed his leadership position in Communist
China. The sequential development of these two alternative models can be graphed as follows:
Procedural Justice

D gree of Intensity

/',
/

I

/

I

''

'

\

'
1952-57
Co-exist

B.

GLF
AntiRi:ghtist

1960-66

1966-1976
Cultural
Revolution

'
'

Revolutionary
Justice

''

'

1976-82
Deng's Era

Time
Dimension

The Sources of Criminal Responsiblity of Chinese
Intellectuals within the Single Party Communist Regime

A single party Communist regime is typified as totalitarian.
Political control penetrates into every sphere of the people's
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daily life. Intellectual life is without exception. The critical character of the Chinese intellectuals and the "dogmatic"
nature of the Communist regime are incompatible. Intellectuals'
individualistic and eccentric tendencies are direct challenges to
the Communist goals of a monolithic, collective society. In the
first instance, their subjective demands for a free environment
is the chief source of their criminal responsibility. Intellectual freedom and the freedom of speech would lead to open criticism and challenge of the correctness of the Party ideology and
Party policy. The liberalization of thought which presupposes
independent thinking would result in the emergence of deviant
ideas and ideological deviances.
These mean the denial of
thought control and thought reform and thus go against the Party
principle of strict ideological conformity and the Party's aim to
eradicate all non-Communist ideologies in order to create a "collective society with a uniform proletarian world view." Mao made
his aim explicit in the ideological front:
In our country, bourgeois and petty bourgeois
ideology, anti-Marxist ideology will continue
to exist for a long time • • • but we have not
yet won complete victory on the political and
ideological front.
In the ideological field,
the question of who will win in the struggle
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
hils not yet been really settled.
We still
nave to wage a protracted struggle against
bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology • • • •
All erroneous ideas, all poisonous weeds, all
ghosts and monsters must be subject to criticism: in no circumstance should they be allowed to spread unchecked.44
Under the Chinese Communist system, students and intellectuals,
in order to progress both ideologically and politically, should
study Marxism-Leninism.
It is considered that "one • • • [hasl
no soul if he does not have a correct political point of view.n4S
Whereas the demand for the democratization of the political system by the intellectuals clashes with the very essence of the
system, single Party leadership has been regarded by Mao and Deng
as the most important principle in Communist China. All these
demands, if realized, would result in pluralism which is contradictory to monolithic rule:
one party, one authority, one
ideology and one culture. Thus, the regime is hostile to the
intellectuals' way of speech and style of thinking, which would
undermine the Party single rule on which the whole system of control is based. This is why "ideological accusation" has been so
common in Communist China. Indeed the definition of the crime is
rather politically relative. In sum, the criminal responsibility
of the intellectuals in Communist China is more or less a function of the scope and degree of the monolithic rule demanded by
the Party leaders. To be more precise, it depends on the democratic values of the Party leaders, which to a large extent
determine how far legal protection can be offered to the
intellectuals.
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On the other hand, the 1mage of the intellectuals in the
eyes of the Party leaders determines their vulnerability to
political forces.
This is especially important with regard to
legal treatment under revolutionary justice which denies the
principle of "all are equal before the law." Because class nature is de-emphasized in the procedural judicial system, criminal
responsibility becomes a function of the level of institutionalization of the legal system and the degree of democratization
of the political system. Finally, since Communist ideology has a
tremendous impact on legal practices, which are subjected to the
open interpretation of Party leaders, justice in the application
of law towards the intellectuals is a dependent variable of the
Party leaders' attitudes and policy toward the intellectuals.
The degree of criminal responsibility of the intellectuals
and the legal protection provided to them in Mao's and Deng's
period can best be compared by their reactions to the intellectuals' demands for freedom and democratization, and the justice
realized in the course of the application of law to the intellectuals within the two legal systems.
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Notes
1.

The concept of "rule of law, • which forms the fundamental
principle of constitutionalism, originates from the Western
liberal tradition.
Individualism, liberalism and rights of
man are the core values of rule of law. Herbert Han-pao Ma,
•communist China and the Rule of Law: Theory and Practice on
Review, n Issues & Studies, (July 1981) I p. 72. It stipulates
a kind of relationship between the individual and the state in
which:
a.

Individuals are guaranteed protection from any arbitrary
power:
it means the absolute supremacy of predominence
of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary
power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on
the part of the government. A.V. Dicey, An Introduction
to the Study of the Constitution, Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979, p. 202.
It further posits that no
man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in
body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordi.nary conception of law.
Dicey, An Introduction, supra,
p. 188.

·b.

Law is to be universal:
it means equality before the
law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary court.
Dicey, An Introduction, supra, p. 202. This simply implies that no man is above the law no matter what power
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c.

Procedural and institutional guarantees exist for the
exercise of rights by individual:
it means the present
of institutional and procedural guarantees to safeguard
and to advance the civil and political rights of the individual as well as to establish social, economic, education and cultural conditions under which one's legitimate
aspiration and dignity can be realized.
Ma, COmmunity
China, supra, p. 78.

The ideals of rule of law, in sum, lay on the imposition of
limitations on the state. That is, executive and legislature
in exercising power provided by both constitutional law and
statutory law as well as the confirmation of the supreme value
of human personality. Ma, COmmunist China, supra, p. 78. The
rule of law postulates free elections and government in accordance with the will of the people, with the corollary that a
government can be removed from power if it loses the support
of the country. Thus, the rule of law safeguards the democratic value of a liberal society. The division of power with
judie iary independence and representative government by free
election are the primary requisites of the rule of law which
is based on the •supremacy of the constitution.a Professor de
Smith stated :
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are free to organize in opposition to the
government in office and where there are
effective legal guarantees in dependent
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London: c. Hurst and Company, 1973, p. 10.
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Chapter Two
The Characteristics of the Legal Systea in Coaaunist
China: Change and Continuity
The legal philosophies of Mao and Deng are opposite. There
are great differences between the revolutionary justice system
and the procedural justice system despite the fact that they both
intended to achieve "proletarian" justice. The former system is
profoundly influenced by politics, while the latter depoliticizes
the system and restores it to neutrality as a means to uphold
justice.
A.

Relationship between the Party and the Judiciary
1.

The Redefinition of Party Leadership and the Assertion
of Judicial Independence

The leadership of the Party over the judiciary in Communist China under Mao was absolute.
The judiciary never acquired an independent status insulated from political influence.
In fact, the Chinese Communists never concealed their rejection
of the principle of judicial independence based on the assumption
that "law and politics are inseparable.•!
During the AntiRightist Campaign, the Party even openly and repeatedly declared
that "Party leadership is indispensable.• The reason given was
that law could not provide sufficient guidance, since the law in
China was not yet complete.2 Article 78 of the 1954 Constitution
provided that "People's Courts shall conduct adjudication independently and shall be subject only to the law.• It was never
put into practice with the excuse that independent adjudication
was a denial of Party leadership·.
Soviet propagandists also
criticized Peking's violation of "socialist legality.• In 1964,
Izvestia declared that:
Things have come to a strong pass when the
secretary of a district Party committee ousts
the judge, sits at the bench himself, and
starts to decide cases. Such instances are
presented
in
the
press
as
positive
experience.3
Shen Chunzhu, first President of the Supreme People's Court,
stated that •our judicial work must serve political ends actively, and must be brought to bear. on our current political tasks
and mass movements.•4 Franz Schurmann concluded that "the Party
in effect had supplemented the judiciary as the instrument of the
law.•S
It followed that only the Party could choose the
judiciary's scope of jurisdiction at any given time, and that the
Party was in a position to decide whether and what kinds of cases
ought to be handled by legal procedures - which were rather formalistic ones under the system of Party committee review and approval cases.
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With the intention of establishing the "supremacy of law"
which is the basis of legal order as well as the separation of
work between the Party and State, the CPC explicitly decided to
restore judicial independence.6 In July 1979, the "Organic Law
of the People's Court" was adopted in which Article 4 stipulates
that "the people's courts shall exercise judicial power independently in accordance with the law." The Central Committee of CPC
later declared to abolish the system of Party Committee reviews
and approval cases.
"The Directive of the Central Committee of
the CPC Concerning the Resolute Guarantee of the Strict Implementation of the Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal Procedure" has
pointed out that "the leadership and cadres of the Party and all
administrative organs, no matter how high their post, and how
great their powers, cannot 'replace law by words,' or use ones'
will or opinion as law or force others to implement."? It further stated that all cases tried must be conducted according to
law.
The new working principle in the organic law of the
judiciary on one hand denies the interference of any administrative organs, public organization or individuals in the adjudication process either secretly or openly when the courts conduct
the trial.
On the other hand, it affirms that cases must be
strictly handled by law and the People's courts should obey the
law only rather than the order from any organs or individuals.S
This manifests the pragmatists' concern over the unhealthy effects of external influence (e.g., the Party) in the judicial
process and the legal nihilism (falu xuwuzhuyi), which was prevalent in Mao's era.
While advocating the importance of judicial independence,
the Party has also redefined the "Party leadership of the
Judiciary" with emphasis on upholding the dignity and uniformity
of law which are expressed in its inviolability and its universal
application.9
The leadership of the Party Committee over the
administrative judicial departments should be strengthened with
respect to major guidelines and policy problems should not intervene in the handling of individual cases by the People's Courts.
The same applies to the People's Procuratorate. In so doing, the
Party first of all denounces the past practices of "replacing law
by words," "replacing law by power," and "replacing law by Party
discipline" in order to establish the dignity of law by remolding the attitude of the cadres and the masses from "being afraid
of power but not law" to the "being afraid of law but not
power."lO The Judiciary, thereafter should obey the law instead
of power.
The most important task for strengthening Party
leadership over the judiciary, as claimed by the Party, is "to
perfect the law through legislation, to guarantee the enforcement
of law and the independence of the people's courts in exercising
adjudication power.•ll As stated by a leading Party official:
In exercising leadership over State affairs
• • • the Party must • • • ensure by every
means the effective functioning of the organs
of • • • judicial organizations • • • carry
out their work =esponsibly and on their own
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initiative.
As
with
other
social
organizations, Party organizations at all
levels must conduct their activities within
the limits permitted by the Constitution and
the Law.l2
Thus "to handle cases based on law is equivalent to obeying Party
leadership.•l3 In the light that "all must observe law" and "law
must be strictly enforced," the Party at the same time asserts
that cadres must set an example and lead the masses to observe
the law and it reminds the Party members that "they do not
transcend but are within the limits of law."
In building up the dignity and the prestige of the judiciary
which was trampled during the Cultural Revolution, an eminent
jurist declared that "the authority of the judiciary must be respected, the decision of the Courts must be obeyed."~4 Since the
people's court is the only organ authorized by the Constitution
and the law to exercise the exclusive power of adjudication, the
verdicts and convictions of the court possess legal binding force
after being put into effect. They cannot be changed arbitrarily
except through prescribed legal procedure, and must be strictly
enforced even if they are in doubt.
In order to prevent any
intervention, the Party committee is now being deprived of its
former power of changing court decisions.
It is strictly the
responsibility of the judiciary to investigate and make final
conclusions.
In sum, as presented by Jiang Hua, the President of the
Supreme People's Court, the most essential principle of socialist
legal system is "strictly handling cases according to law and
unswervingly insisting on the independent adjudication of the
people's courts." The strengthening and correctness of the party
leadersip in the new era is a function of how far this principle
can be achieved. In short, these are the guidelines for perfecting procedural justice. Thus, the expansion of the activities of
the courts and the de-emphasis of the role of extra-judicial institutions are the prominent phenomena of the legal development
in the PRC since the rise of Deng.
2.

Recruitment and Staffing

The Party has controlled the recruitment policy and the
staffing of the judiciary.
This was especially significant
during the Anti-Rightist Movement.
The Party took action to
•purify" the judiciary by removing from its ranks all those cadres -- both Party and non-Party -- whose behaviors or words were
considered as
"rightist • or
"anti-party. •
To ensure
the
ideological purity of the judiciary, the Party restricted the
selection of judges to Party cadres.
Judiciary personnel were
subject to study, criticismJ struggle and other techniques of
ideological indoctrination.!~ The "redness" of the legal cadres
prevailed throughout Mao's leadership.
This policy has not been abandoned by the pragmatists but
the orientation and the spirit are completely different. The new
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staffing policy is based on ra1s1ng the professional standards of
the legal cadres.
Summing up their past experiences, the Communist leaders have realized that only with a profound understanding of the law can legal cadres and judges enforce the law
properly. Thus, what they have endeavored to do is to emphasize
the professional quality of the legal cadres. Jiang Hua has said
that adjudication is a professional task, thus the legal cadres
must be experts.l6 Other leaders like Ye Jianying have called
for "fearless judges and procurators who are read_y_ to sacrifice
their lives for the dignity of the legal system"I7 by being an
impartial judge who enforces the law strictly without any fear of
power. The Party has now undertaken the task of professionalization of the legal system as a form of strengthening the Party
leadership over the judiciary and has formally put an end to dispute over "red" and "expert" in the field of the judiciary.
3.

Party Policy Versus Law

Before 1976, the contents and application of law, especially criminal law, typically the Act of the People's Republic
of China for the Punishment of Counterrevolution (hereinafter
referred to as "Act"), as well as court verdicts, were decided by
Party policy and the Party line, but did not strictly adhere to
the "law." This means that Party policy was above law. The Party directed and led the judiciary through its policy:
"The
relationship betwen Party policy and the people's democractic
legal system is one in which the policy of the Communist Party is
the soul of the people's democratic legal system.
It is an importaii'tinstrument for the realization of Party policy.nl8 The
Communists stressed that "the policy of the Communist Party is
not only the basis for enactment of law, but also for the application of laws, and jurisdiction changes as Party policy
changes.nl9 Law was on1y the routinization and regularization of
Party policy which shared the same nature and status with Constitution and laws.
It was said that "even after the completion
of law in the future, we must still work according to the concrete conditions, and grasp the spirit of Party policy in order
to enforce law accurately. n20 Party policy thus determined the
contents and essence of the law, for example, the 0 Act," which
varied at different times, or with different movements. Due to
the ambiguity of the crimes and penalties defined in the "Act,"
the legal cadres, especially during mass campaigns, had to adhere
to Party policy or directives to decide the degree of severity of
the crime and punishment, whether "suppression" or "leniency.a
Thus, when the legal cadres conducted trials on counterrevolutionary crimes, they had to have a full understanding of Party
policy, otherwise they would be accused of being "conservatives"
or "rightists 0 :
The Party leadership of counterrevolutionary
struggle is done through party policy.
The
policies made during the struggle is the
weapon that guarantees the entire enforcement
of law.21
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In short, there was a lack of a written legal code throughout
Mao's era.
Under the new principle that the "law is supreme,• the
relationship of law and policy has been redefined.
It is said
that •only when the law is incomplete should we follow policy.
But after there is law, we must act according to the law.•22 The
past practices are criticized as the "rule of man• in the light
that the cadres thought that when there was policy, there was no
need for law. This idea that "Party policy is law• is being denounced because the Party leadership recognizes that the major
cause for past mistakes was a lack of law and a lack of respect
for law. Although the law is the crystallization of Party policy
and is the regularization of Party policy, it cannot then be inferred that policy can replace law.Z3 The understanding of Party
policy of course contributes to realizing the essnce of law but
the function of policy cannot be exaggerated for this will lead
to overlooking the prescriptive nature of law. The Party for the
first time has asserted that in practice one must not stress
policy too much and disregard law. The proper relationship is
that the two are complimentary and cannot replace each other
since they are of different natures. Although law is enacted on
Party policy, it is more mature and perfect than policy, in terms
of stability, continuity and uniformity. Policy is in the hands
of Party leadership, and is the will of the leadership, so it is
rather unstable as it changes when the will and attention of the
leadership are changed. Law cannot be changed by any individual,
any amendments must be publicly declared and worked out according
to prescribed procedures. 25 Moreover, the law is above policy
since law is enacted by the highest authority of the state. The
Party, on the other hand, makes policy. Thus the law possesses
the mandatory nature and authoritativeness which outweighs policy. Thus, policy is bound by law which cannot contradict to law
but must facilitate its enforcement. Furthermore, the compulsory
nature of policy is not for all, whereas law is enforced through
the coercive power of the state organs imposed on the whole country. The violation of laws will be penalized. Though law can be
proposed by the Party, it must, however, be scrutinized, passed
and promulgated by the NPC. Since law is supreme, there are no
individuals or organs that transcend the limits of the law or who
are above the law. One may conclude that the enactment of and
implementation of law are the fundamental form and important
methods of Party leadership and •to obey law is the same as obeying Party leadership.• Finally, the Party has warned that policy
cannot direct the enforcement of law, for this would be a denial
of the value of law.
B.

The Distinction of "Two Cateqories of Contradictions• versus
the Principle of "All Are Equal Before The Law•

Mao's ideas deeply affected the operation of the Chinese
legal system. He explicitly pointed out that in handling legal
cases, the legal cadres had first to decide the nature of the
case whether it was •a contradiction among people• or •a contradiction between the people and the enemies.•26 These considerations dominated and politicized the application of law.
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In Mao's theory, the proletariat constituted the core group
of "people." The peasants came next, as the surest allies of the
proletariat. As for the bourgeoisie, petty or national, it was
stipulated that they were only admitted to the exclusive club the
"people" on good "political" behaviour. With the exception of
proletariat, peasants and soldiers, the political and legal status of all other classes or strata was uncertain. Even within
the same group, for example, the intellectuals, some might be
categorized as "people," while others are "enemies."
The
categorization of the contradictions was totally dependent on the
understanding and the interpretation of the "six criteria" laid
down by Mao in the "Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the
People" which were strictly political ones. In fact, the nature
of the contradictions depended on one's political attitude and
behavior as well as "class essence": one was likely to receive a
more severe punishment for a given offense than a person who was
not a black element.27 The contradictions between people were to
be dealt with by the methods of persuasion and education, democracy and discussion while coercion, repression and compulsion
were to be applied to antagonistic contradictions.
Based on
Mao's legal philosophy in which political force remained the sole
judge of the category of contradictions, the use of distinction
of contradictions publicly repudiated the principle of "all are
equal before law."
The legal practice of "all are equal before law" seems to be
a challenge to the former practice of the distinction of two categories of contradictions. Under this principle, law is applied
to all without exception: all must obey law, whoever violate the
law must be dealt with and sanctioned according to law,
All are equal before the law - this is a
slogan of our entire people, the entire
Party membership and all or revolutionary
cadres; it is an ideological weapon in our
fight against any one who pursues privilege.
Before the law, Party members and revolutionary cadres have only the obligation to
take the lead in observing it in an exemplary fashion, and they have no special
right whatsoever to violate it.
Whoever
breaks the law and commits a crime, no matter how great his seniority, how important
his office and how large his contributions,
shall not be indulged and shielded but shall
be punished according to law.28
According to the Party, regardless of socio-political status, differences of social essences and political backgrounds,
whether or not the crime of the accused committed belonged to
antagonistic contradiction, all are equal before law in the application of law which also refers to the equality of judicial
process. Based on this, even counterrevolutionary crimes should
be punished according to law. The same is for the crimes among
the people.29 In other words, regardless of whether the crime is
classified as one between the contradictions among the people or
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antagonistic contradictions or a general crime or counterrevolutionary crime, all must be tried and punished according to
the Criminal Law.
Thus, the application of law is being
depoli tic ized.
It is clear that the crimes among the people are beyond the
question of "correct and incorrect."
They are instead legal
questions. Thus all should be sternly punished by law since the
subject of punishment is a criminal offender, with all offenders
receiving punishment of the same nature.30 This sheds light on
the Party's denial of the disctinction of the nature of contradictions which are to be handled differently especially when
the sphere of dictatorship gets smaller and smaller.
It is said
that the distinction of two categories of contradictions is
fundmentally based on political attitudes.
This is incompatible
with decisions based on the nature of the crime which is a concrete action. 31 It is standard to distinguish people from enemies but in no sense the standard for evaluating whether one has
committed a crime.
In fact, the nature of contradiction and the
constitution of a crime are two completely different concepts
which must not be confused.
It follows that antagonistic contradictions do not necessarily constitute a crime and by the same
token, not all criminal cases belong to antagonistic contradictions. To adopt the practice of the distinction of contradiction
falls short in two respects.
The first one is the question of
criteria, for it is difficult to distinguish "people" from •enemies. •
Secondly, there is a tendency to confuse political concepts with legal concepts and indeed, political standards cannot
supersede criminal provisions which would lead to a disregard for
the status of the law and would be unrealistic. With the promulgation of the Criminal law, any distinction of contradictions
would only lead to the violation of the principle of "all are
equal before the law" as well as "handling cases only subject to
law." Indeed although the Party has not yet openly abandoned the
old practice, the assertion of the restoration of the principle
of "all are equal before the law" has rendered the distinction of
contradictions irrelevant and it eventually will become insignificant in the legal practice.

c.

Legality Concerning the Deeming of Offenses and the
Application of Penalties (Zuixinq Fading Zhuyi)

The Party under Mao adopted the principle of flexibility in
the definition and application of law. According to the Chinese
Communists this practice possessed positive value during the
transitional period which was marked by radically changing conditions and complicated political struggles.
Flexibility was the
guiding principle of the "Act" which the Party preserved as an
elastic interpretation of the criminal law. Thus, the "Act• explicitly stipulated the use of analogy in Article 16:
"Those
who, with a counterrevolutionary purpose, commit crimes not
covered by the provisions of this Act may be given punishments
prescribed for crimes [enumerated} in this Act which are comparable to the crime committed." The reason given was that since
struggles were of a long term nature, it was impossible to list
all types of crime.
It further argued that if crime by analogy
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was not employed, the Party could not suppress the crime in a
timely effective and efficient way. But in Western practice use
of analogy should be permitted only when such an action is advantageous to the criminal prosecuted and is prohibited in case of
any discriminative effects that would arise.32 The practice by
the Chinese Communists is just the opposite. Punishing by crime
by analogy contradicts the general principle of nulla poena sine
lege (no crime without a pre-existing prohibitory rule).
Under
this principle, if the crime is not "clearly" or "explicitly"
defined in the criminal lawk it does not constitute a crime and
is not subject to sanction.~3 The spirit is built on the basis
of the protection of individual rights and the prevention of
criminal abuse. But to the Party, this principle only restricted
its power: the limitations imposed by law, its rigidity and binding force, all prohibited the Party from carrying out "struggles"
through political campaigns at whim.
The method of analogy was
flexible and could be widely used without any limitations.
At
the same time, it also confirmed the principle of severity of
punishment and the practice of "it is better to risk condemning
an innocent man than to save a guilty one.• The Party ideology
is in fact incompatible with this principle. The flexibility of
the •Act" was enhanced by the permission in Article 18 for the
retroactive application of the "Actn to "counterrevolutionary
crimes• committed before the "People's Republic" carne into
existence:
It applies to the crimes committed in the
basis of People's Revolution which have not
been tried, and all the crimes committed
during the KMT reactionary rule.34
Moreover, after the Communist regime's abolition of all the laws
of the Republic of China, civil and criminal codes were never
enacted. This enabled the Party to make full use of the "Act, n
as an omnipotent tool for struggle. Thus power and rank became
the decisive forces in trials.
Power was the law, truth and
•crime and punishment were stipulated by power:" whether one had
committed the crime and the severity of the punishment depended
on the will of those who held power.
"Legal nihilism" thus developed. The phenomenon was that:
there is no unified Criminal law, lawlessness has become universal • • •
The
concept of a legal system has become very
shadowy indeed among both the cadres and the
masses • • • • There are cadres who openly
protect criminal members of their unit
• • There are cadres who set up their own
laws.35
As

With all its ambiguities and vagueness, the law possessed the
character of a universal penal code and afforded the Party maximum flexibility for the purpose of eliminating its political opponents and thus furthering Party policies.
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With the promulgation of the Criminal Law, one must ask
whether its enforcement is based on the principle of nulla poena
sine lege or on "criminal analogy." Engels once said that "all
parties and classes which seize the power through revolution demand the absolute recognition for the legal s~_stem created by the
revolution, and is to be treated as holy. •36 This highlighted
the importance of upholding the dignity of law. In light of past
practice, the Party under the pragmatists has realized the advantage of conducting crimina! convictions and punishment based
on the principle of nulla poena sine lege. It enables crimina!
trials to punish accurately the criminal offenses, to protect the
people and to create a stable social order for social modernization. Secondly, only if cases are handled by law can the defects
of the "rule of man" be rectified thereby working toward the
universality of law.
Thirdly, the law which explicitly prescribes on paper what is legal and illegal advises people clearly
of which conduct is criminal. With the adoption of the principle
of "crime and punishment stipulated by law," the legal cadres and
judges no longer hesitate in their adjudications to suit the will
of the leaders. On the other hand, the Party does not deny the
practice of analogy. But the crime must be "serious" so as to
make analogy necessary. Even so, the Party has warned that analogy must be employed "cautiously" and "must be confirmed by the
Supreme People's COurt" (which is not specified in the "Act") .37
A commentator stated that "our legislation is inclined to the
principle of crime and punishment stipulated by law (hereinafter
referred to as "Principle") in adopting the method of criminal
analogy. n38
All these aim at timely sanctions for those
criminals whose crimes are not written in Criminal Law and at the
prevention of arbitrary analogy. Towards the perfection of the
Criminal Law, it is believed that the boundary of "criminal analogy" ought to be narrowed. Only when "criminal analogy" is based
on the "Principle" can the law be used to protect people's rights
and people will no longer be afraid of the law. The confirmation
of the positive value of the "Principle" reveals that the pragmatists have become conscious about the past practice of •crime
and punishment decided arbitrarily," and are aware of the lack of
authoritativeness of the law which has been the object of policy.
All these have negative effects on the long term social stability. The "Principle" indeed can define the criminal law more accurately, and correct the above defects in order to preserve social order.
The Criminal Law differs from the "Act" in that although
both provide for a retroactive application, yet the former is
more precise and clear concerning the time for retroactivity.
The Criminal Law has certain prescriptions: 1. If the highest
legal punishment is life imprisonment and capital punishment, the
case must be reviewed after twenty years; after confirmation by
the Supreme People's Procuratorates, it can be investigated;
2. The time for retroactivity is a function of seriousness of the
crime committed - the heavier the longer. It can be over twenty
years for individual cases.39 The time and conditional limits
set for retroactivity can reduce the room for flexibility.

- 35 -

D.

Towards Deeoliticization in the Distinction Between Criminal
and Non-Cr1minal

The "Actn in the People's Republic of China under Mao chiefly served the political purpose of eliminating the enemies of the
regime.
An individual's family, economic, political and even
educational background could also constitute the source of coun~
terrevolutionary crimes.
Thus counterrevolutionary crimes were
of a political nature and were of the content of "purges" and
"struggles." "The theory of the unique importance of class origin" was the typical expression of the political nature of the
"Act."
Counterrevolutionary crimes tended to be all inclusive
crimes. The Party did not separate counterrevolutionary crimes
from other general criminal crimes or civil cases.
From the
viewpoint of the Communists, who employed the principle of a presumption of guilt,40 all categories of crime contained the essence or aim of "anti-Party" or "anti-Communist" regimes.
The
sole standard was political. General speaking, any words, deeds
or ideologies which hindered the achievement of the monolithic
rule or attempted to damage the monolithic order, or violated the
newly-set standards of social behavior, were said to be counterrevolutionary:
politically opposing the Party leadership, or
criticizing policiesi opposing the socialist roadi ideologically
opposing or doubting "Chinese Communism"i or violating Communist
ethics. In sum, whatever deeds, words or thoughts, no matter how
serious, intentionally or unintentionally, all were regarded as
counterrevolutionary if they were opposed to the Communist rule
or harmful to its interests.
In realizing its past defects, the Party has tried to be
more clear in the content, conception and definition of what is a
"crime" in the distinction between criminal and non-criminal,
especially between
counterrevolutionary crimes and
general
crimes. Depoliticization of definition of crime tends to be the
direction taken.
Generally speaking, the core criterion for criminal offense
is conduct or action. Accordingly, first, the conduct must be
harmful to the societyi secondly, the conduct must be intentionali and third, all crimes and conduct must be punished in accordance with the Criminal Law.41 The Criminal law is thus aimed at
preventing the reappearance of "ideological crimes" (sixianq fan)
by which one is proved to be guilty purely to one's ideological
thoughts as well as crimes which are based on irrelevant objective criteria such as social status and family background. Another objective is to separate counterrevolutionary crimes from
general crimes which have been generally confused in the past.
The Party has openly announced that there is no such crime
as an "ideological crime. •42 Any ideology or thinking which is
wrong or even reactionary, as long as it has not been translated
into action, is not harmful to the society.
It thus does not
constitute a source of crime.
The Party has in fact admitted
that the appearance of "incorrect" ideologies is inevitable, and
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has accepted this fact.
Dong Biwu has also pointed out that
"there is a strict difference between treatment towards those who
only possess reactionary ideologies but without counterrevolutionary activity and counterrevolutionary elements. •43 The Party's "Guiding Principle for Inner-Party Poltical Life" adopted at
the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee expressed that "matters of right or wrong in ideology and theory
can be solved only by the method of presenting facts and reasoning things out and conducting democratic discussions, and on no
account should the method of coercion be adopted.•44 Party members point out:
Opposition to a certain view of a certain
comrade cannot be equated with opposition to
this comrade; opposition to a certain comrade of a certain leading body cannot be
equated with opposition to the leadership,
let alone opposition to the Party.45
The same spirit can be applied to the judicial practice in distinguishing the boundaries of ideological questions, political
questions and criminal questions. Article 90 of the Criminal Law
has set conduct as the sole source of judgement for counterrevolutionary crimes, but it is emphasized that not under all
conditions is this judgement correct. Marx once said that "those
laws which do not set its base on conduct but the style of thinking of the people concerned as the chief standard of crimeJ it is
equated with the open recognition of illegal conducts. •46
The
Communist Party seems to have the intention of rectifying the
past practice of subjectivity.
Moreover, the Party has cautiously redefined "the crime of
counterrevolutionary propaganda incitation" and the principle of
"blame not the speaker. •
More concrete elaboration has been
made. The Party clearly shows that freedom of speech is relative
but not absolute:
in case of not violating those legal conditions concerning rebellious incitation, slander, obscenity, profanity, false witness and the leakage of state secrets; one can
speak freely.47
Thus, freedom of speech must be conducted according to law. On the other hand, since the •crime of revolutionary propaganda incitation" is the most confusing and sensitive one, the Party has made it more specific. The Criminal Law
defines this crime as "inciting the masses to resist or to
obstruct the implementation of China's laws or decrees with a
counterrevolutionary motive; or such things as distributing counterrevolutionary leaflets or other means of propaganda inciting
the overthrow of the dictatorship of [the] proletariat and the
socialist system." This is not to punish thoughts and words but
the conduct that breaks the law.
Actionable conduct must:
first, be counterrevolutionary; and second, be harmful to the
PRC. It is claimed that only reactionary thought short of inciting behavior does not constitutee a crime. For the principle of
"blame not the speaker,• it is specified that if the speeches do
not fall into an¥ article on the Criminal Law, all are to be considered non-crim1nal.
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In condemning "ideological crimes," cautiously defining the
crime of counterrevolutionary propaganda incitation and the
principle of "blame not the speaker" as well as making a clear
distinction between criminal and non-criminal, the Party has encouraged legal cadres and the general public to understand the
boundaries of the freedom of speech in order to prevent the past
practice of accusing guilty parties based on ideological differences.
The Party has also reasserted that "we cannot arbitrarily label as 'anti-Marxist' or counterrevolutionary crime in
dealing with those who have different ideas."
People have the
right to criticize the leadership and cadres and to raise
opinions. Even if the criticisms are incorrect, the people still
cannot be punished. Marx's idea that "Law is the Holy Bible of
the people's freedom•48 perhaps has become the new legal philosophy of the Party.
E.

From Mass Trials and Mass Movements to Qpen Trials and
Strict Observance of Legal Procedures

Mass trials and mass movements have been the common practice
in the Chinese legal system under popular just ice, especially
during the early years and the Cultural Revolution.
Both were
judiciary practices for popular participation. Mass trials, the
trials of landlords, rich peasants and all exploited classes were
held publicly, mostly before peasants. The final verdicts were
usually conducted based on the demand of the "masses." The mass
trials were based upon the policy of "mass line" which characterized the administration of the law during that time.49
Mass movements were of a similar nature. They were lawful
movements for developing mass self-consciousness, demanding democracy and carrying out laws and decrees.SO It was said that
the principle of the legal work of the dictatorship of the proletariat was basically speaking, the question of relying on the
masses to carry out dictatorship.Sl
Mass trials and mass movements were treated by Mao as a
means to educate the masses about values, and policies of the
Party.
Their political use thus outgrew their legal purpose.
They were used to arouse the hatred of the exploited masses
against the classes other than the working class and peasantry,
such as counterrevolutionaries and "undesirable elements" and
thus to involve the masses directly in the struggles. The Communists wanted to promote political consciousness because:
The Chinese peasants have for thousands of
years
undergone
the
cruel
political,
economic, ethical and cultural exploitation
and oppression of feudalism, and unless we
have a moment to awaken them, we will not be
able
to
educate
the masses
in
their
thoughts, to awaken the awareness of the
masses, or to achieve economic and political
equality.
That is to say, unless we go
through the force of a movement, we will not
be able to break down the firmly rooted old
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feudal system or the old order, and we will
not be able to establish a new democratic
system or a new order.52
As the focus of the regime has shifted to the restoration
of social order for socialist modernization under the leadership
of Deng, it is said that the class struggle should be handled in
accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Constitution and
the Law:
• to launch this struggle, it cannot
take the past form of political campaign but
to follow the principles of a socialist legal system.53
Thus the procedural judicial system stresses conformity to legal
procedures. The People's Public Security Bureau is responsible
for the investigation of all criminal cases. The People's Procuratorate is responsible for review and decisions for arrest and
prosecution; whereas the People's Court is responsible for
trials.S4
It is prescribed by Article 8 of the Law of Criminal Procedure that "all cases handled by the People's Courts, except for
those involving special circumstances as specific by law, shall
be heard in public. • A public trial is conducted by the Court
openly and independently.
This differs from a •mass trial. •
Only after being sentenced as guilty through a trial can the legal status of the •accused" be converted to that of a criminal
offender.
Throughout the trial, the court adopts neither the
principle of assumption of guilt nor the presumption of innocence
but the principle of "neither guilty nor innocent•: no accused
shall be adjudged guilty and sentenced without evidence other
than his confession; he shall be convicted and punished if there
is sufficient evidence against him without his confession -- that
is, the principle of taking facts as the basis and the law as the
sole criterion.SS In principle, the burden of proof rests on the
prosecutor whereas the accused has no right to refuse to answer
related questions.
The accused has the right of defense, appeal
and the demand for protection during the proceedings which enable
him to have an adequate chance of self defense. All these rights
were not provided in the past. The Party stresses that punishment is to deter crime, and it has no relationship with the distinction of the two categories of contradictions which are based
on political attitudes. The Party has indicated that the •theory
of essence• cannot be adopted as a source of adjudication in
criminal proceedings.
Criminal conduct must be separated from
family background and the political history of the accused. The
trial focuses only on the crime committed by the accused. The
President of the Supreme People's court, Jiang Hua, pointed out
that public trial must conform to legal procedures and it must be
conducted by the court organized on the basis of law. Adjudication must be made by the court members and adjudicators must be
professionals; the trial cannot be conducted in mass assembly and
the verdict cannot be announced by those other than the official
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members
of
the
court.56
These
assertions
have
formally
repudiated the use of mass trials, the system of Party committee
review and approval cases as well as those trials which are not
conducted according to legal procedures which have been the
manifestation of despising law.
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Chapter Three
The Chinese eo..unists' Attitude and
Policy Towards the Intellectuals
Mao's policy toward the intellectuals was heavily influenced
by his attitude towards the intellectuals which was formed even
before the beginning of his revolutionary career.
Reviewing
their past political experiences, Deng and his colleagues have
realized the mistakes committed by the Chinese Communist Party
under Mao. Thus they tend to be more realistic and careful in
formulating their policy toward the intellectuals.
A.

The Communist Attitude towards the Intellectuals under Mao

The Chinese Communist attitude towards intellectuals, as
represented by Mao, is a conflicting one.
On one hand, they
valued the positive contribution of the intellectuals.
On the
other hand, they believed there is an ideological contradiction
between them and the intellectuals.
As early as the revolutionary period, Mao emphasized the
significance of support from the intellectuals:
In the long and ruthless war of national
liberation, in the great struggle to build a
new China, the Communist Party must be good
at winning intellectuals, for only in this
way will it be able to organize the millions
of peasants, develop the revolutionary cultural movement and expand the revolutionary
united front.
Without the participation of
intellectuals, victory in the revolution is
impossible.l
After establishmemnt of the Communist regime, Mao and the
top party leadership endeavored to draw the intellectuals' support. This can be observed in the Communists' efforts during the
early years in administrative recruitment and absorption of intellectuals into the state machinery and their unequivocal expression of welcome to the non-Communists to serve the •central
People's Government to Build up a new China.• It was mainly due
to the realization that without the co-operation and participation of the intellectuals, the Communists would not run the
government smoothly and successfully.
In fact, many Chinese
•liberal intellectuals" -- educators, writers and artists, technlclans, professional people
had accepted the Communist
leadership and its program of "New Democracy. •2 Moreover, the
intellectuals were the chief source of knowledge and skill for
social and economic reconstruction which could not totally rely
on the workers and peasants who were mostly illiterate or poorly
educated. As expressed by Zhou Enlai in 1956:
• • • if
socialist

we want to
construction
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go ahead with our
on
the
largest

possible scale, quickly,
effectively and
economically, we must rely on the energetic
labor not only of the working class and the
broad masses of the peasants, but also the
intellectuals. • • • The different construction projects in which we are now engaged
require the participation of intellectuals in
ever growing numbers.
• Thus intellectuals have become an important factor in
every aspect of our national life. To find a
correct solution for the question of intellectuals to mobilize them more effectively
and make fuller use of their abilities in our
gigantic work of building socialism, has
therefore become essential if we are to fulfill the fundamental tasks of the transition
period •• ,3
Although Mao recognized the indispensable role of intellectuals in the building up of socialism, his treatment of the intellectuals was chiefly utilitarian. As described by Jerome B.
Grieder:
Even a government which distrusts the elitist
implications of the intellectual vocation and
resists the intellectuals' claim to autonomy
must make use of their skills and make place
for some exercise of independence on their
part:
if
not
"freedom of
speech
and
opinion,• then at least some encouragement to
preserve and perpetuate intellectual skill.4
According to Marx, only the proletariat alone is really a
revolutionary class while all other classes are conservative or
even reactionary.S Mao yielded to tbis notion and had faith only
in the working class and peasantry. Mao thus never concealed his
discriminative attitude in favor of the workers and peasants:
started as a student. • • • At that time I
felt that the only clean people in the world
were the intellectuals • • • • After the revolution when I joined with with the workers,
peasants, and soldiers, I gradually came to
know them thoroughly, and they too gradually
came to know me • • • • Only then did I basically outgrow those bourgeois and petty bourgeois sentiments which the bourgeois school
had taught me.
I came to feel that the intellectuals not only were in spirit unclean
in many places, but their bodies too were
unclean.
The cleanest ones were still the
workers and peasants -- even taking into account that their hands were black and their
feet covered with cow dun9, they were still
cleaner than the bourgeois1e, big and small.6
I
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In fact, Mao, before the beginning of his revolutionary career,
already possessed an anti-intellectual sentiment.
His distrust
and prejudice against intellectuals developed from his personal
experiences and ideological bias. Throughout his life, he lacked
confidence in the revolutionary spirit of the intellectuals and
was continually suspicious of their devotion to the Communist
cause.
Mao's attitude towards the aloofness of the intellectuals
was shaped by a sense of resentment which came from his unpleasant contacts with the intellectuals, namely, the philosopher
Hu Shih, when he was a library worker in Peking University.
It
was these contacts that contributed to a bitter distrust over
intellectuals as a group in Mao's mind.7 During his revolutionary years, his prejudice was deepened by the tendency of the intellectuals to "use words but to avoid direct involvement in
practical problems." This led him to conclude that the intellectuals were only to be regarded as necessary collaborators and
could never be the central elements of the revolution. To him,
the intellectuals often tend to be subjective
and individualistic, impractical in their
thinking and irresolute in action until they
have thrown themselves heart and soul into
mass revolutionary struggle or made up their
mind to serve the interests of the mass and
become one with them.
Hence although the
mass of revolutionary intellectuals in China
can play a vanguard role or serve as a link
with the masses, not all of them will remain
revolutionaries to the end • • • • Some will
drop out of the revolutionary ranks at critical moments and become passive, while a few
may even become enemies of the revolution.B
His bias against intellectuals can be reflected in a comparison
on the firmness of the standpoint of them on revolution to that
of the workers and peasants:
Once a storm comes, the intellectual's position is clearly different from that of the
workers and the majority of the peasants.
The former is wavering while the latter is
firm; the former is ambiguous, while the latter is clear. 9
Mao always asserted that the workers and the peasants were where
the strength of revolutionary force rested.
The Chinese Communists summarized the weakness of China's intellectuals as
follows:
( 1)

Because of their close association with the
landlord class and the bourgeoisie, most intellectuals are disdainful of the laboring
people.
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(2)

Since most intellectuals have not participated in the hard struggle for production or
in the bitter national and class struggles,
they can only rely on book knowledge and
consequently commit such ideological errors
as subjective thinking, reformism, utopian
socialism, and egalitarianism.

(3)

They lack courage in combating reactionary
forces • • • • They are eager to participate
in the revolution when it is successful, but
become pessimistic when it suffers a reverse.

(4)

The petty bourgeoisie are accustomed to a
liberal and individualistic way of life
and
are
averse
to
organization
and
discipline .10

Reduced to a more fundamental level, it is the class nature
of Communist ideology that had strengthened Mao's bias against
intellectuals.
To Mao, the "Chinese intellectuals" could be
placed in the category of petty bourgeoisie, judging by thei~
"family-origin," their living conditions and their political outlook.
The Party later pointed out the bourgeois background of
the intellectuals:
• • • Most of the intellectuals come from
families of landlords, rich peasants, and the
bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes, and
have been contaminated by bourgeois education.ll [emphasis added]
Therefore, from the viewpoint of Mao and other Chinese Communists, the relationship between the Party and the intellectuals
remained basically one of class struggle. Moreover, since "they
are more or less equipped with bourgeois scientific knowledge,"
their ideology belonged to the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie.
It was clear for Mao that only a few of them had accepted
Marxism-Leninism, even those who had joined the Party. Mao had
once said that:
There are many Party members who have joined
the Communist Party organizationally, but not
yet joined the Party wholly, or at all
ideologically. Those who have not joined the
Party ideologically still carry a great deal
of the muck of the exploiting class in their
heads, and have no idea at all of what proletarian ideology or communism, or the Party,
is.l2
It is then clear that the nature of the conflicts between the
Chinese Communists and the intellectuals is a question confined
to the ideological realm:
the contradiction between bourgeois
and petty bourgeois ideology and the proletarian ideology, or in

- 48 -

another sense, the contradiction between Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Zedong thought and that of non-Communist ideologies.
Mao's thought was characterized by revolutionary romanticism. For him, profitability and efficiency had to give way to
political expediency.
Ideological purification and political
reliability were his own image of the intellectuals' outlook:
what he wanted was to remould intellectuals into a functionary
group with •correct ideology• because their knowledge came from
the old society and from bourgeois education, and they could not
be used until they had undergone Party education and revolutionary conditioning.
He would feel easy only when the intellectuals' bourgeois ideas had been totally eliminated and replaced
by Communist ideology as well as their integration with the workers and the peasants:
If our intellectuals and art workers who have
come from the rank of the intelligentsia one
would make their own work welcomed by the
masses, they must transform and completely
reconstruct their own thought and feelings.l3
He had demanded without reservation, even with coercion, that the
intellectuals reform themselves ideologically. Accordingly, •the
intellectuals can overcome their shortcomings only in mass struggle over a long period.•l4 Indeed, •struggles• had been launched
on that party of •proletar ian ideology against non-prole tar ian
ideologies• since the rectification campaign in Yenan, 1942:
They [the intellectuals] must continue to
remould themselves, gradually shed their
bourgeois world outlook and acquire the proletarian Communist world outlook so that they
can fully fit in with the needs of the new
society and unite with the workers and
peasants.
The change in world outlook is
fundamental. We hope that they will continue
to make progress that in the course of the
work and study, they will gradually acquire a
grasp MarxismCommunist world outlook,
Leninism and become integrated with the workers and peasants.l5
Thus the intellectuals were urged to develop themselves by taking
part in the struggles of the masses and to practice •selfcriticism• known as inner cultivation or ideological cultivation:
it is • • • in the main struggle in our mind
between the ideology of the proletariat and
other ideologies as a struggle in our minds,
between the Communist outlook on life •
and other outlooks on life • • • • 16
Mao, due to his distrust of the intellectuals, redefined the
role of the intellectuals, especially the traditional relationship between them and the workers and peasants. In the past, it
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was the intellectuals or the so-called elite of the society who
monopolized the political power and were in the dominant position
to design the social outlook, that is, to socialize the value or
ideology they wish to mould the society. But under the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is the workers and the peasants, as
represented by the Communist Party, who hold the power and impose
their own ideology on the intellectuals, forcing them to remould
their thought so as to get rid of their bourgeois ideology and
feudalistic thinking which are harmful to the construction of
socialism. Thus the intellectuals are "deprived of the authority
of design. They become like other men, laborers: skilled artisans who could render services essential to the construction of
the new order, but who are no longer entitled to think of themselves as its architects.nl7
Since not all the intellectuals were willing to reform themselves and accept Marxism-Leninism, in Mao's words, "there are
still some intellectuals who are skeptical about socialism or do
not apprve ot if.nl8 A forceful method, for example thought reform or indoctrination, was deemed necessary.
As a whole, the attitude of Mao towards the intellectuals is
an ambivalent one: he needed the services and the prestige of
the intellectuals, yet he suspected the intellectuals of harboring latent anti-Communist tendencies and did not feel comfortable
unless their non-Communist weltanschaaung was totally eliminated.
Indeed the intellectuals had been all subject to various kinds of
attacks, discrimination and humiliation because the Communist
regime under Mao had relegated the role and status subordinated
to that of the workers and peasants and were excluded from the
category of "people."
B.

The Policy Towards the Intellectuals under Deng

Having learned their lesson from the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution, the pragmatic leaders have only
strengthened their feeling that without the participation of intellectuals as well as their support, any attempt to modernize is
doomed to failure.
They are still shocked by the price paid
under the ruling of the "red" cadres. Yet the knowledge and initiative of the intellectuals can be effectively translated into
constructive efforts and benefits to the regime only in the case
of voluntary support rather than a coercive one. Though the role
of the intellectuals has become more important than ever as the
system is evolving towards an institutionalized single Party system, there must be a corresponding change of the ruling patterns
within the system in order to accommodate the demands for democracy from the intellectuals. Otherwise those conflicts that occurred in the past might reoccur. Disillusioned by the Communist
rule under Mao as well as their unpleasant relationship with the
Communist Party, the intellectuals tend to be more realistic, and
in some sense, more cynical. They cannot forget Mao's suppression, humiliation and persecution of the intellectuals since 1954
which culminated in the Cultural Revolution. They thus demanded
more concrete guarantees for their status, freedom and dignity.
In realizing the hostile character of the Communist regime toward
-
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their so-called "bourgeois world outlook" and having been subject
to criminal sanctions in the past, they hardly trusted the system.
Absent fundamental reform in the system has been which
would create a better environment for them, both political and
academic, the intellectuals would continue to harbour such
sentiment. Moreover, unless their basic rights and freedoms, as
written on the Constituion, could be guaranteed through legal
institutions and their class status could be improved, their confidence in the regime will remain shaky. As long as the intellectuals still hold the viewpoint that they are only an "indispensable cog" in the modernization and that their role is instrumental only, it will be difficult for them to be devoted
wholeheartedly to the regime, especially when they have doubts in
the goodwill of the Party.
In short, the contribution of the
intellectual is a function of dissipating their suspicions towards the Party.
The Party must convince the intellectuals that they will be
treated by the Party as "intellectuals," as "people" and their
relationship with the Party is no longer one of class struggle,
that their demand for basic freedom is met and safeguarded from
any infringements.
To what extent the freedom of intellectuals
can be tolerated within the system does constitute a serious
question for the Party leadership. Provided with the intolerance
of the Communist Party and the exclusive nature of the Communist
system, it i~ extremely difficult for the Party to gain the intellectuals' trust. From the viewpoint of the intellectuals, the
Party's future policy towards intellectuals lacks credibility.
They are not optimistic about the present leadership. Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether the goals and interests
of the Party and the intellectuals are compatible.
It is true
that both groups hope for the modernization and strengthening of
China. The difference is still the old one: how? The intellectuals demand democratization and the rule of law, which is not
surprising since these conditions are the only ways to safeguard
their interests from arbitrary rule. Within the present system,
the intellectuals feel uneasy because even if the leadership is
sympathetic to the demands of the intellectuals, Party policy
changes frequently, and there is a lack of institutionalized
guarantees. These are the fatal defects of the single party regime that cannot be denied.
The nature of the system and the
Party ideology have in fact set the limits for the longitude and
latitude of the reforms that can take place. In the past, it is
the Party that distrusted and discriminated against the intellectuals, now it is the intellectuals who feel alienated from the
system and lack confidence in the Party.
In light of the above analysis, the most urgent task for the
regime is to solve the conflicts between the Party and the intellectuals. The former persecution and oppression of the intellectuals are denounced. The basic orientation of the present policy
of the Party is to remove the intellectuals' suspicions towards
the Party regime in order to re-establish their faith in the
sincerity of the leadership in eliminating all the past
discriminatory policies. In order to achieve this, the Party has
to rectify the prevailing attitudes of despising knowledge and
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intellectuals which have taken root among the cadres. This is by
no means an easy task.
Despite the difficulties, the Party
leadership has abandoned the Maoist policy and has introduced a
range of new policies within the limits permitted.
Indeed, the
aim of the policy is to create the image that the Party thereafter would respect the intellectuals as "human."
In short,
"treat them equal politically, use them with trust, and be concerned with their living standards"l9 are the three great principles of the appeasement policy towards the intellectuals.
The
aim is to remove the anti-elitist image of the Chinese Communists
as represented by Mao.20
1.

The Redefinition of the Class Status of the Intellectuals

The unpleasant relationship between the Party and the intellectuals in the past is derived from Communist ideology.
In order to eliminate the root of the past conflicts of the
Party with the intellectuals and to win their support to work for
modernization, the Party has formally redefined the class status
of the intellectuals. The intellectuals are now identified with
the working class and have become part of the "people." As early
as 1978, Deng had already "upgradedn the political status of the
intellectuals:
• • • Generally speaking, the overwhelming
majority of them [intellectuals] are part of
the proletariat. The difference between them
and the manual workers lies only in their
different roles in the social division of
labour. Those who labor, whether by hand or
by brain, are all working people in a
socialist society.21
The term 0 stinking number nine" which was assigned to describe
the intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution has been denounced.
In doing so, the Party hopes to provide a sense of
political security to those who have long been considered as
"bourgeois.n Their vulnerability to political forces due to the
past uncertainty of their status as "people" or "enemies"1
"revolutionaries" or
"reactionaries"1
and
"proletariat" or
"bourgeoisie" is greatly reduced, at least apparently. The Party
has further made this change official by condemning discriminative policies and affirming the new status of the intellectuals
in the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our
Party since the Founding of the CPC" in 1981, saying that:
We must firmly eradicate such gross fallacies
as the denigration of education, science and
culture and discriminating against intellectuals, fallacies which had long ex is ted and
found extreme expression during the Cultural
Revolution.
We unequivocally affirm
that, together with the workers and peasants,
the intellectuals are a force to rely on in
the cause of socialism.22
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The Party has often reiterated that the intellectuals can no
longer be treated as "forces opposed to the people" or •enemies•:
In the past few years, the Party has done a
lot of work in bringing order out of chaos
for intellectuals.
The Party has in theory
and policy expounded and affirmed that the
intellectuals of our country, like workers
and peasants, are part of the working people
and an important supporting force of our
Party.23
The correct way to treat the intellectuals, it is said, "is a
question of correct[ly] handling the relationship among the working class itself: it is no longer one of handling the relationship between the working class and its allies. •24" In short, Hu
Yaobang said that it is imperative to strengthen the unity among
the workers, peasants, and intellectuals.
He claimed that any
viewpoint that separates mental labor from physical labor is
wrong.25 There, in reality, exists no class distinction between
mental and physical labor. The intellectuals are now politically
equal with the working class and peasants.
On the other hand, this policy is in tended to show that the
Party has faith that the intellectuals are politically reliable:
it is an historical prejudice that intellectuals are politically
unreliable. 26
Most in te llec tuals are said to have acquired a
proletarian outlook since "they are patriotic, love the Party and
socialism, and are willing to serve the people.•27 Thus no matter what their background, most are trustworthy according to the
Party leaders. They have already integrated themselves with the
workers and peasants in terms of their commitment towards the
Communist regime. Under these circumstances, the title of "bourgeois intellectuals" is removed and is now the working class intellectuals.
At the same time, the past policies of •uniting,
educating and remoulding" are declared outdated and no longer
applicable to the intellectuals.28
The Party has refuted the past idea that "the more
knowledgeable, the more reactionary" and has denied that the intellectuals can only "be used" but cannot be trusted. Deng and
other leaders said that "we must fully trust and freely use
people with specialized knowledge. •29
In fact, under the new
policy, the Party has already rehabilitated the reputation of the
intellectuals.
Many intellectuals who were purged during the
Cultural Revolution have been restored to their former position.
Deng now considers the political standard of redness in
terms of contribution instead of in a purely political sense.
This is more realistic:
•to devote oneself to our scientific
socialism and contribute to it is an important manifestation of
being red, the integration of being red and expert.•30 In other
words, the greater one's devotion to his work, the greater one's
devotion to socialism. In regarding the proper party leadership
towards intellectuals, it is said that the Part¥ ought to assess
accurately the role of intellectuals in social1st construction,
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trust them and rely on them, place them in proper positions and
help them to attain progress ideologically and politically.31
Most significant of all is that Party membership, which in the
past was monopolized by workers and peasants, is now open to the
intellectuals.
Accordingly, it is estimated that up to 1982,
one-fourth of the members admitted into the Party were intellectuals.32 For the first time in the history of Communist China
the intellectuals have received the same political treatment as
the working class and peasant in concrete terms. The spirit of
the present party policy is reflected in the Communist assertion
that •under present circumstances, if we should reform the intellectuals, we should reform them in the same way as we reform the
workers and peasants.•33
2.

The Reassertion of the Indispensable Role of Intellectuals in
Socialist Construction

Since the "Anti-Rightist n campaign, the Chinese Communists,
notably Mao, reduced the role of the intellectuals in building
socialism.
The Great Leap Forward was an attempt to boost
economic development by relying on the workers and peasants.
This tendency culminated in the Cultural Revolution during which
nearly all the intellectuals, both Party and non-Party, were
either purged or dismissed from the leading posts.
They were
replaced by •red• cadres. The disasters resulting from these two
•experiments" led to the bankruptcy of Mao's mass-line politics
in modernization since most cadres were "red• rather than "expert,• and thus were professionally incompetent.
The post-Mao Party leadership shares the consensus that the
Party can successfully promote the well-being of society only if
it can co-opt the intellectuals into the gigantic task of the
Four Modernizations.
In fact, this is the chief motivation behind the Party policy for including the intellectuals in the
working class. In this regard, the Party has shown unprecedented
concern for the recruitment of the intellectuals into the Party
and the establishment and the emphasis on the importance of
knowledge. Indeed never since the establishment of the PRC have
the intellectuals been regarded by the Party as so important.
The same is knowledge which the Maoists had openly condemned. In
these respects, the Party has admitted without reservation:
In the past, owing to the influence of
•leftist• ideas and the small-producer mentality, erroneous views such as the underestimation of the importance of education,
science
and
culture
and
discrimination
against intellectuals were rife in our Party
over a fairly long time.34
The reversal of past policy towards intellectuals began in
early 1978 when Deng delivered his speech at the opening ceremony
of the National Science conference and the policy was further
consolidated in the Third Plenary Session of CPC Central Committee in late 1978. Attempts have been made to resume the tradition of respect for knowledge and intellectuals.
To eliminate
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ideological obstacles for enlisting the support of intellectuals,
oeng has made clear that knowledge itself is not class-bounded.
He emphasizes the importance of "acquiring a higher level of
scientific knowledge and general knowledge" as the country moves
towards modernization. In short, "to raise the status and expand
the role of education, science and culture in our drive for modernization"35 has been adopted as the basic policy line which
paves the way to raise the status of intellectuals. Hu Yaobang's
words have to a large extent, highlighted the Communist treatment
of knowledge:
In our country which is backward economically
and culturally, it is the key to determine
the success or failure of construction or
whether we can master the modern science,
culture and knowledge.36
Since knowledge is power, and is vital to the socialist
development, the intellectuals are now regarded as a force on
which the Party must rely. The Party intends to build "a mammoth
force" of well-educated and more professionally competent cadres
to assume the responsibility of administering the modernization
program. It is said that:
We must put intellectuals, both Party and
non-Party members • •
into appropriate
leading posts so as to gradually raise the
number of cadres who have a good educational
level and technical expertise and who know
how to manage in the leading bodies of enterprises and undertakings to 30, 50, and 70
percent of the total staff.37
Intellectuals are thus considered as indispensable since there is
a severe shortage of talent in China.
A commentator recently
stated that "without the participation of the intellectuals, it
is impossible to achieve the four modernizations. n38 Deng has
claimed that "we must value talent since it is difficult to have
talent"39 and "in order to achieve success in socialist modernization, we must have knowledge and talents. n40
Other Party
leaders like Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang, and the late Liao Chengzhi
have also foreseen that as modernization proceeds, there will be
an increasing need for the services of intellectuals.
In
response to this, Liao pointed out that "as the country develops,
the obligation of the intellectuals will become heavier and
heavier. "'~l Hu confirms that "in the course of our great mission, we must respect and rely on the intellectuals. •42
This
culminates in the condemnation of Mao's theory that •red can lead
everything" and it puts forward the assertion that the intellectuals are "core • members in science, technology, culture and
education, public health, literature, and art.
3.

The Guarantee of Certain Freedoms

The Party leaders now have a true understanding from past
experience that "no talents can be cultivated if there is no
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freedom of expression. n
In fact, dogmatic thinking imposed on
the intellectual world and suppression of freedom in the pursuit
of knowledge choked the academic circle of its vitality and
creativity for nearly three decades.
Scientific and general
knowledge were in a state of inertia.
In order to reverse the
tide, the Party advocated the policy of the emancipation of the
mind and the policy of the "two hundreds":
In the academic field, the policy of "letting
a hundred flowers blossom, and letting a hundred schools of thought contend" must be implemented in real earnest and different viewpoints and schools must be allowed to freely
contend. [sic]43
Indeed, there would be no creativity and initiative if there
were no debate among various schools of thoughts and if the atmosphere of free discussion in academic circles was suppressed.
The intellectuals would soon lose the incentive to study and
research if too many restrictions were imposed on them. To the
intellectuals, progress can only be made in a free academic environment in which the scholars can exchange their ideas. Learning that science and the intellectual world cannot prosper in the
absence of democracy, Deng has criticized the "suppression of
discussion" and "the prohibition of intercourse" under the Gang
of Four w.hich he described as an improper style of learning.44
Independent thinking is now re-emphasized. "Dare think, dare say
and dare do" as well as "seeking truth from facts" is Deng's conception of the proper style of learning.45 In light of the fact
that academic democracy is very important, he and other Party
leaders like Hu Yaobang have encouraged intellectual discussion
and the exchange of viewpoints in scientific and academic
circles.
"At present," as pointed out by Deng, "the contentions
among different ideas and discussions are not too many but too
few. n He comforts the intellectuals by saying that "incorrect
ideas may appear through discussion but this is not strange and
need not be afraid.n46
In order to eliminate doubts over the sincerity of the Party
policy in adopting a democratic line in the intellectual world,
Deng has publicized the need for the institutionalization and
legalization of democracy.47 At the same time, he reiterated the
"principle of three nots": not seizing others' faults, not putting labels on people and not using the "big stick." By saying
that, "it is not horrible even if some people use democracy for
other purposes out of discontent, n48 Deng intended to show the
Party's resolution in promoting democracy even with some unintended consequences.
The core of the policy which the Party is
going to uphold is that opinions must be permitted to be raised
and academic contention must be allowed. As a whole, freedom of
discussion, freedom of creation and freedom of competition in the
intellectual world are confirmed.
Through these measures, the
leadership hopes to satisfy the demands of the intellectuals in
order to mobilize their positivity and creativity for the four
modernizations.
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4.

The Creation of A Better Objective Environment for the
Intellectuals

Other than rhetorical measures, the Party has indeed in the
past few years taken concrete actions to improve the treatment of
the intellectuals.
All such measures are intended to raise the
incentive of the intellectuals in order to transform their
knowledge and skills into a constructive force to foster the Four
Modernizations.
Simultaneously, they are also intended to improve the image of the Party in the eyes of the intellectuals.
The Party is concerned about the living standards and working environment of the intellectuals.
The Party leaders have
realized that only with adequate living standards and better
working conditions can the intellectuals concentrate their attention on their work, study and research.
The conclusions of a
survey on intellectuals' present conditions reveal that:
In general, the working, studying and living
conditions of these intellectuals are relatively unsatisfactory and there are many
problems. 49
In Communist China, the pay for the intellectuals has been lower
than that of the workers and peasants because of class discr imination. Many have criticized that:
Intellectuals, especially middle-aged intellectuals, who are the backbone element of
teaching and scientific research, are shouldering heavy tasks.
Their burden of livelihood is also heavy.
It is unreasonable that
their wages are below average.
They must be
paid accordin9 to their work.so
Reacting to this phenomenon, Deng has said that it is necessary
to subsidize and offer assistance to the intellectuals who thereafter must be paid with the salary they deserve.Sl His statement
has formally put an end to egalitarianism and now one's pay is
assessed according to his competency.
Wage adjustments, the
problem of overcrowded housing, health problems, and the problem
of married couples being assigned to separate localities have
already received attention.
The intellectuals can also be exempted from political affairs such as political study.
Deng has claimed that hard work
in research is not a crime but must be encouraged.
Thus he
specified that with regard to the intellectuals, for example the
scientists, "we cannot bother them with political affairs, we
must provide them with time and the environment which will enable
them to conduct their research."52 Moreover, the Party has also
tried hard to improve their access to books and information.
The leading cadres are now encouraged and urged by the Party
to assign the intellectuals to the work that needs their
services.
As instructed by the Party, they must trust the
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intellectuals fully, respect them, use them without reservation
and give them both authority and responsibility.
The Party is
very concerned about whether the intellectuals have been placed
in proper positions so that they have the opportunity to make
full use of their knowledge. It is said that in working with the
intellectuals, the cadres must be democratic and take care of the
intellectuals:
Leading comrades and comrades in charge of
Party work and political work must have a
democratic style of work, listen earnestly to
the opinions of scientists and technicians,
actively back their rationalization proposals
and inventions, encourage them to continue to
ponder on and raise problems and solve them53
and
when a problem arises, there should be frank,
sincere exchanges of views to reach an understanding and proper settlement. As to intellectuals with failings and mistakes, warmhearted help should be given.54
Also, they must listen and accept the opinions of the intellectuals who must be given a free hand to work in planning. Then
cadres are also assigned the task of selecting outstanding intellectuals to take over leading posts and managerial tasks. They
are warned that this must be truly implemented.
To facilitate
their work, the Party has also established a special system for
the intellectuals.
For example, a sound technological responsible system is set up for technicians who can take part in the
management of the enterprise.55
In order to clear the way for the new policy toward intellectuals the Party has already taken action to rectify incorrect
attitudes of cadres towards intellectuals by eliminating the
legacy of the Gang of Four.
It condemns the wrong idea of discriminating against the intellectuals:
All cadres at various levels must realize the
role and contribution of education, science
and culture in the socialist modernization.
This is the key to implementing correctly the
policy towards intellectuals.56
Within the party, the leadership has launched a lesson to educate
the cadres about the policy towards intellectuals and the correct
attitudes toward non-Party intellectuals.
To increase the incentive for the intellectuals to work, the
Party has announced that those who have the qualifications must
be conferred with suitable titles and are to serve the NPC and
People's Congress at various levels as well as CPPCC, especially
the middle-aged.
The intellectuals can also be recruited into
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Finally, outstanding intellectuals are offered the opportunity to further their study in advanced Western countries and
absorb advanced knowledge and technology. Academic exchange with
foreign scholars is arranged and encouraged.
The leadership
hopes that through these interactions, the level of academic
knowledge and scientific knowledge of the country can be raised.
This
knowledge
is
an
invaluable
asset
for
Socialist
modernization.
In short, the Party has made every endeavour to create and
provide a favorable environment for the intellectuals whose contribution is essential to the success of socialist modernization.
In sum, the core of the Chinese Communists' new policy toward intellectuals can be summarized by Hu Yaobang 's speech on
the centenary of Marx's death:
Firstly • • • to establish the correct concept to valuing
scientific
and
general
knowledge, and to mobilize the whole Party
and the whole people to strive to acquire
knowledge of modern science and culture.
Secondly, to oppose the erroneous tendency of separating intellectuals from the
working class, juxtaposing them with the
workers and regarding them as "alien force,"
to confirm the correct concept of intellectuals as part of the working class~ and to
strengthen a hundred fold the unity between
workers and peasants on the one hand and intellectuals on the other.
Thirdly
to implant the correct
concept that all leading personnel must
strive to be experts~ and to ensure that our
cadres become better educated and professionally more competent by becoming more
revolutionary-minded.58
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Chapter Four
Demands for Intellectual Freedom and
Democratization of the Communist System
Intellectual freedom is subsumed under the broad concept of
"human rights." Human rights is a totality of political rights
and civil liberties that people exercise and enjoy in a society.
It presupposes both the advancement of individual's material and
spiritual well-being. Intellectual freedom can only be possible
under the condition of emancipation of mind and freedom of expression.
It is impossible to practice intellectual freedom
under the imposition of a dogmatic thinking of mind. The basic
principle of freedom of person in a spiritual sense is based on
the confirmation of the supreme value of human dignity. While
the Communists believe that there are only two diametrically opposed class world views -- that is, proletarian versus bourgeois
-- and that the latter must be replaced by the former under Communist rule, the intellectuals deny the class nature of world
view. They do not believe that there is an authoritarian world
view which is the sole standard of "truth" and which possesses
the nature of absolute truth.
Democratization of a political
system, generally speaking, is a process through which insti tu.:.
tions, whether formal of informal, become under popular control.
Thus, what the democrats and democratic dissidents demanded
during the "Hundred Flowers" and the "Beijing Spring" Democratic
movement was the opening of the government to the general public
so that the people would have more chances to influence or participate in the policy making through direct election.
Intellectual freedom and democratization of the political
system have been advocated by the intellectuals in Communist
China which by its nature, negates all these demands.
A.

Conditions in the Maoist Era before the Hu Feng Incident

The most severe violation of freedom of person in Communist
China is the ideological reform or indoctrination imposed on the
intellectuals who .traditionally were highly respected.
This
practice transcended physical torture to the spiritual realm by
using a technique which is considered to be the most inhumane in
the liberal world:
the notorious "thought control." The Communists were uneasy about the bourgeois background of the intellectuals. Mao had already paid attention to this question during
the revolutionary period and demanded the intellectuals to remold
their thoughts on a "voluntary" basis. Thought reform did not
receive serious attention until the Communists consolidated their
power in the post-revolutionary period.
The most important
requisite for the intellectuals in serving the regime properly
was a "correct" ideological viewpoint and political outlook.
This meant the open repudiation of non-Communist ideologies and
the acceptance of a proletarian ideology. The intention of the
regime to construct an ideological monolith had rendered thought
reform of the intellectuals a primary concern, especially after
such a practice had been institutionalized.
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The ideological rectification movement was launched in 1952
after the Third Meeting of the First Plenary Session of the
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference.
At the meeting, Mao emphasized the importance of
"ideological remolding of all intellectuals." The utmost insult
to the dignity of the intellectuals came from criticism and selfcriticism as well as the coerced acceptance of an ideology from
which they were alienated. Though the program of "reform through
labor" did not become penal law until 1954, yet in reality, it
had already been applied to stubborn intellectuals (e.g., Feng
Yulan and Liang Shuming). It possessed the nature of penal law.
Party policy, in fact, was the law in the Communist mind.
Although it was stipulated by the Chinese Communists that
the citizens of the People's Republic of China "shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association • • •
• ,•1 which were later formally written to the Constitution (Article 87) in 1954, there were no legal guarantees for people to
exercise these rights.
It was surprising that "freedom of
thought" and "publication" were deleted in the 1954 Constitution.
On one hand, the Party had always asserted that people could enjoy unprecedented freedom under the Communist regime. Yet, on
the other hand, it was the Party which constantly violated the
Constitution and encroached on the fundamental freedoms of the
people.
The stipulation was significant to the intellectuals
since a free working atmosphere was the driving force behind
their trek to Yenan. During the Yenan era they pleaded for less
interference in cultural and intellectual activities, more opportunities for debate, and a greater tolerance of different
viewpoints.
In the post-revolutionary period, the Party set up •strict"
ideological standards for intellectual work and also prescribed
that work "must be related to the political and class struggle.•2
To the Communists, knowledge was to serve only as a tool for
achieving political objectives
that is, it had a strict
utilitarian role. Knowledge had to belong to and serve a definite class, as well as express a definite political line. Never
had the intellectuals been given a free hand to go ahead with
their work and they were not encouraged to assume responsibility.
Though the Party had warned the intellectuals to obey the Party
line and policy, yet the intellectuals did not give up any attempt to voice their ideas and opinions on the dictatorial nature
of Party policies and the suppression of freedoms.
The political system, from its very beginning, was already
under the strict control of the Communist Party. This tendency
became more prominent after the 1954 Constitution when the coalition Government was transformed into Communist Party rule. The
Communist monopoly of political power aroused widespread discontent especially among the intellectuals because this meant dictatorial rule which violated the democratic rule as promised by
the Communists.

- 65 -

Case One -- The Hu Feng Incident
Hu Feng was the first intellectual who took action to reflect his discontent with the Party's imposition of dogmatic
thinking and authoritarian policies on the literary and art
circles.
A Brief Account of Hu Feng and His Relations with the CPC
Hu Feng was a Marxist critic who for thirty years sided with
the CPC and the leftist writers. He was one of the chief disciples of Lu Xun. As early as the 1930s, Hu already treated himself as an orthodox leftist literary theorist and Marxist.3 Yet,
his line of thinking was less dogmatic than Mao and Zhou Yang.
To a large extent, he disagreed with their ideas about the
Marxist theory of literature. Zhou Yang, for the most part, was
the decision-maker and the leader of the Communist literary circle. Mao backed his group both before and after the establishment of the PRC. Hu and Zhou had long struggled for the orthodox
position in the Communist literary circle. During the War, Hu as
the editor of the literary magazine Xiwang [Hope] had already
established his theory and his own circle to contend with the
•yenan group•: the theoretical base was Mao's "Talks at Yenan on
Literature and Art" (hereinafter referred to as Talks).
While
the Communist literary leadership treated Mao's "Talks" as the
•Holy Bible, n Hu had expressed his discontent with the "Talks"
and advocated a •subjective spirit• which Mao intended to combat.
Hu continued to debate with Zhou's group and never concealed his
discontent with their manipulation of Party literary policies and
the imposition of their interpretation of Marxism on writers.
Hu's group was in fact the opposition "party" within the leftist
literary circle.
In 1952 Hu was forced to engage in selfcriticism about his theory of literature. This only served to
increase his discontent with the Party policy of strict control
represented by Zhou, in both ideology and creation.
In July
1954, he boldly submitted his three hundred thousand character
•apinions on Literary Questions• (hereinafter referred to as
Opinion) to the Central Committee in hope of reversing the tide
in order to liberalize the literary circle. Though Hu's aim was
merely to present his opinion in ·the field of literature, the
Party had treated it as a direct challenge to Party leadership
and policies on literature. This led to the purge of Hu Feng and
his followers.
The Demands of Hu Feng
1.

The Attack on the "Five Daqgers"

The first dagger concerned •the compulsory nature of
Marxist ideology. a
Hu refuted the Communist idea that the acquisiton of the Marxist world view was the pre-requisite for creation. He felt that as soon as a writer had mastered the creative method of socialist realism, the writer could produce meaningful articles without invoking systematic Marxism. 4 He cited
Lu Xun as an example of a writer who never read deeply into
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Marxism.
Hu also warned that such
hinder the writers from creation.

a

requirement

could

only

The second dagger which he attacked was that only the life
of workers, peasants and soldiers was the sole viable source of
inspiration.
In this regard, there came his own theory that
"life is everywhere, •5 and thus, there was more than one source
of literature.6 This was contradictory to Mao's idea that people's life was the sole legitimate source of literature. In proposing there were alternative sources, Hu intended to eliminate
the restrictions on writing imposed by Mao.
Hu's third dagger was related to ideological reform.
He
opposed making thought reform compulsory and suggested that
writers ought to engage in it on a "voluntary" basis. For Hu,
ideological reform could be done only through the practice of
writing, and only then could Marxist literature be created. The
writer would otherwise be trapped in dogmatism. Hu and his followers rejected the Communist idea that the only way for
ideological reform of the writer was either through the study of
Marxism-Leninism or through the participation in the mass struggle.? Indeed Hu's conception of thought reform was just the opposite of Mao's theory that "being determined consciousness.•
The fourth "dagger" was "literary form imposed by the Party.• For Hu, the most urgent task was not to learn the cultural
heritage but to inherit the new cultural tradition of the MayFourth Movement and to learn its modern form. He objected to the
doctrine of "back to the ancients" because there was not much
worth learning from the ancient literary forms. On this point,
he shared same idea as Lu Xun. Guo Moruo accused Hu's advocacy
as an attempt to "weaken and destroy the national prestige and
dignity of China.•B
The fifth "dagger• was the topic defined by the Party. What
Hu disagreed with was the subordination of literature to politics
which deprived the autonomy of literature.
He believed that
topic for writing should be broader and without restriction.
This idea was a reaction to the Party prescription that writers
were allowed only to praise "the brightness of revolutionary victory,• to write about the life of workers, peasants and soldiers,
to write their glories but not their dark sides. For him, a realist writer had to disclose both the brightness and the darkness
of the proletariat, revolution, socialism and the Party. On the
other hand, the bourgeoisie ought not in all cases be condemned.
His philosophy emphasized the loyalty to reality and had room for
•art for arts' sake.•
Basically, Hu's non-dogmatic attitude towards Communist
literature and opposition to Maoist literary theory owed its origin to Stalin: write the reality.
Let the writer learn from
life. If he can reflect the real life by means of high level of
artistic skill, he can surely attain Marxism.9 Thus Hu's understanding of Stalin's literary theory was his chief inspiration in
looking for a total liberalization of the literary circle.
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2.

Hu's Demand for Organizational Reform in the
Literary Circle

As soon as the Communist regime was established, the
Party set up a framework of control over the activities of the
writers through organizations. The Party adopted this practice
from the Soviet Union and set up the All-China Federation of Art
Circles (hereinafter referred to as Federation) and the Chinese
Writers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union).
All newspapers, journals, and magazines were placed under the control of
these two organizations.
The writers had to join either the
Federation or the Union before they could write and publish.
Thus, for the sake of survival, all the wirters became members
either of the Federation or the Union. As a result, the writers
whose style of life was originally characterized as liberal and
undisciplined were forced to earn their living and conduct their
writing under strict organizational discipline.
Standards and
criteria were set for writers in the publication of their articles.
They were constantly under the supervision of personnel
cadres and the Party Committee within the Federation and/or the
Union.lO Unhappy with pervasive Party control in the literary
circles, Hu proposed the disengagement of Party leadership in
literary organizations.
In his •apinions,• Hu's directions for reform of the
literary organizational method were based on the Soviet example
in order to show that he had no intention to detach from Communist principles.
In reviewing the Soviet theoretical guidelines in the literary circle, Hu had pointed out the speciality
of literature and thus concluded that free competition should be
practiced in the literary world.
His four suggestions for reform which paved the way for free
competition were, first, the abolition of the media and magazines
under Party contro1.11 Second, the dismissal of all "czeation
centers• which were under the administrative control of the Party.
He believed that the Federation and the Union were "official• organizations possessing no mass character.l2
Third,
writers should have free association and organization in the
reorganization of publications, presses and magazines, each of
which should be under the editorship of an influential writer.
The selection of writings to be published and the determination
of salary should be under the jurisdiction of the editors and not
the Party. Creation centers should be organized publisher which
was aimed at guaranteeing the freedom of creation of the
writers.l3
Last, reform was in need with regard to the Party
leadership over literature. This included the abolition of the
system of compulsory study and emphasized self-study by the
writers.
Editors were obliged to report the conditions of the
literary circle to the Central Propaganda Department. The daily
work of the publications were to be administered by the writers
and not the Party. Although there were still Party Committees,
they had to respect the speciality of literature.l4
In sum, the new arrangements entailed the total surrender of
Party leadrship.
Hu' s suggestions were exactly what Guo Moruo
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had criticized:
to dissolve the organization unit of literary
circle from Hu 's point of view was unnecessary and would only
have a harmful effect on the literary circle: to stop the present
publications since they were under the control of the faction
Zhou Yang and had lost their autonomy. These were to be replaced
by "free competition" based on market regulations and "publications run by individuals.•lS
The demand for liberalization was attacked as based on
"capitalist ideology" which would lead to "the disintegration of
the literary circle, and detachment from the ideological leadership of the proletariat.• The result would be "the disintegration of the literary circle, and detachment from the ideological
leadership of proletariat," as well as "factionalism and the
domination of capitalist ideology. •16 Thus, Hu was accused of
being "Anti-Party" for his advocacy for the abolition of Party
leadership and for his hatred of the re-enforcement of Party
leadership on
the
literary movement
and
the
support
it
received.l7
Case Two -- The Advocacy for Democratization of the
Political System During the Hundred Flowers Campaign
In order to relax the tension between the Party and the intellectuals after a series of repressive activities and thought
reform since the rise of the regime, Mao saw the need for a more
moderate policy to appease the intellectuals' discontent sentiment.
It was this consideration, together with the Hungarian
Crisis that provoked the policies of "Let A Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let A Hundred Schools of Thought Contend" and "Long-term coexistence and Mutal Supervision. •18 These policies took "blame
not the speakers but be warned by his words" (yanzhe wu zui,
wenzhe zu jie) as the basic principle.l9
Along with the slogan of "long-term co-existence and mutual
supervision" in the Communist political system, there came an
earnest desire for the democratization of the regime which had
been monopolized by the Communist Party since 1949. The pressure
from the leading non-Communists was especially strong. In fact,
the political system was a dictatorial one.
Zhang Bozhun,
Minister of Communication and the Deputy Chairman of the Democratic League, and Luo Longzhi, the Minister of the.Timber Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Democratic League, are representative advocates for democratization.
1.

The Attack on the Dictatorship of Party Rule

"True socialism is highly democratic but the socialism
we have here is not democratic. •4!0
So Lin Xiling accurately
described the totalitarian nature of the Communist Party regime.
She stated explicitly that socialism belonged to the people and
not to the Party.
Zhang and Luo were moderate compared to Lin,
but their speeches did not conceal their discontent with dictatorship by Party rule.
In stating that "democracy is not
enough," Zhang questioned the Party, "Inasmuch as democracy is to
be developed,
why stress the leadership of the Communist
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Party?•21 He suggested that Party organizations and Party members in fact exercised control over virtually everything, and
this had deprived the members of democratic parties the chanc~ to
play their due role in state affairs during the past several
years.
On this point, Zhu Auping, Editor-in-Chief of the Guangminq
Ribao [Enlightenment Daily] frankly criticized the key problem of
political life reflected in the relations between the Party and
the masses which was the idea that "the World belongs to the Party.•22 He pointed out that •a party leading a nation is not the
same thing as a party owning a nation. The public supports the
Party, but members of the public have not forgotten that they are
'masters of the nation.••23
He criticized the Party in its
violation of promises for a coalition government:
Before the liberation, we heard that Chairman
Mao wanted to organize a coalition government
with non-Party members •
Now there are
twelve deputy premiers in the State Council,
not one of whom is a non-Party man. Could it
be that there is not a single person among
the non~Party people who can sit in a deputy
premier's chair, or that none of them can be
groomed to hold this chair?24
The same phenomenon was observed by Yang Yue when he said,
"Before the Constitution was promulgated, the government looked
like a coalition government. But now, all the democratic parties
have been kicked away.•25
Both Wang Gulun (Chairman of the Standing Committee of the
Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee) and Zhang had cited the
operation in the Standing Committee of the NPC in decision-making
to show the dictatorial nature of the Party regime in the name of
coalition government. According to Wang, "On many occasions when
important matters were under discussions, often only the democratic personages spoke, whereas the Party members declined to
utter a word. Does this indicate that the Party has already discussed and made its decision on the matters concerned?•26 If so,
some contended that the discussion on major policies as well as
their approval was only a gesture.
Zhang also had the same
opinion and said that "if the Party or State Council respects our
opinions, why do they not ask for our opinions before dec is ions
are made? Without discussion in the Assembly, the issues presented for approval were the result of formalism and oligarchy.
Bow could this be democracy and democratic politics?•27 He used
the "character reform• as an illustration: before a draft was
announced, the policy was treated as if it had already been approved. There was no discussion of whether the characters ought
to be reformed and how to reform them. The implementation tended
to be compulsory. The people simply had no channel through which
to speak.
This as described by Zhang, could only be Party
dicta tor ship.
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Luo stated the case differently, "the Party has replaced the
government."
In fact, the Party was attacked for monopolizing
everything: the Party made decisions about everything, the Party
was the whole people, the Party was the state and the law. There
was opposition to the notion of substituting the Party for administration and suggestions for the separation of the Party and
State. The duties and authority of the State administrative organs and of the Party organizations had to be clearly demarcated.
2.

The Abolition of One-Party Rule

As pointed out by Gao Peizhi, a lecturer at China
People's University, "China belongs to 600,000,000 people including the counterrevolutionaries, it does not belong to the
Communist Party alone."28
Therefore, the first step for the
democratization of the political system was the abolition of oneparty rule. Huang Ziping, a teacher in the Third Girls' Middle
School of Tianjin was the first to advocate allowing the nonCommunist parties to rule. Accordingly, Huang said:
Although the democratic parties are allowed
to exist and the political platform of those
parties is to advance in the direction of
Communism, why could not the method of rotating the democratic parties in power be adopted?
If we cast away one-party rule by the
Communist Party and let the Communist Party
and all other parties put forward their different political platforms, leaving the decision to free election by the masses of the
people, the Communist Party and all the democratic parties would work harder to overcome
their shortcomings in order to solicit more
votes on the basis of their services to the
people.29
The democratization of the political system,
incompatible with single-party Communist rule.
3.

in

fact,

is

The Demands for the Enlargement of the Role of
Democratic Parties

The democratic parties were described as the eyebrows,
but not the nose and eyes of the Party. The eyebrow "is not indispensable." At that time, both Zhang and Luo only wanted the
democratic parties to have a greater role to play in the
decision-making process as well as greater powers for their members. They had no intention of competing with the Communist Party for the ruling position.
Zhang had made such a plea in the
early period of the rectification campaign:
The role and develoment of the CPPCC are
being strengthened.
I think that beginning
from its 3rd plenary session, more political
_tasks for the CPPCC fihould be considered.
res
powers,
for
1ns tance,
to
hold
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consultations, make proposals and exercise
supervision could be strengthened. The CPPCC
could gradually be turned, in the course of
political life, into a democratic link in the
parliamentary system required for the Chinese
people's democracy. After this plenary session, we should strengthen the work of the
CPPCC at all levels from the central to the
local.30
Concerning the present role of democratic parties, Hu Zitang
was discouraged by the attitude of the Party towards the democratic parties: "at the present moment, the relationship between
the Communist Party and democratic parties ought to be closer.
But in fact, this was not the case, rather their relationship has
been relatively estranged. For example, since the declaration of
the line of 'long-term co-existence and mutual supervision,' the
Party has not yet discussed with the democratic parties about a
set of concrete measures in order to carry out mutual supervision.•31 He suggested that from the angle of an organizational
connection, a set of measures related to their relationship and
working methods should be established to facilitate that purpose.
In order to enlarge the role of the democratic parties, Luo
treated it as a demand that all democratic parties should decide
the national policy with the Communist Party as well as the
mutual share of the power. Thus, Luo demanded an equal status
with the Communist Party in the decision-making process.
The
past practice was that:
What embarrassed the democratic parties most
was the lack of information required for the
study of policies. At the Standing Committee
meetings of the NPC and the CPPCC, the democratic parties could not voice any effective
opinion on matter under discussion because
they were not informed in advance of the matters to be discussed, and they had no time to
study them at the moment of discussion.32
He therefore proposed that when any
cided, the democratic parties should
the information and materials related
the chance to discuss it at the same
Communist Party.

major policy was to be debe provided in advance with
to it and should be allowed
time as the members of the

Luo was supported by Zhang who believed that equality, independence and freedom between the Communist Party and democratic
parties ought to be relative. For him, suitable conditions had
to be created in order to achieve these aims. He pointed out
that •at present, some institutions, and regulations exist as
obstacles for the realization of equality and independence and
freedom as well as the functions to be performed by the democratic parties.•33
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On the question of the power of democratic parties and their
members, it was said that it had to be decided how to organize
the participation of democratic parties in the governmental administration.
Zhang said that at present many state affairs were
decided by the Party and the orders were made through the party
system but not the administration.34 The members of democratic
parties who took up administrative responsibilities felt that
they did not have the power corresponding to their official position.
Thus, they hoped that real power was to be given to the
non-Party administrators so that they could function effectively.
Later Zhang made the suggestion for a political design department
and said that the Communist Party should fully co-operate with
the National Committee of the CPPCC, the Standing Committee of
the NCP, the democratic parties and the people's organizations in
discussing important policies and problems.
The department as
advocated by Zhang should take in more non-Party intellectuals
with technical and field experience to work with them.
All these proposals were aimed at improving the power position of democratic parties vis-a-vis the Communist Party as well
as breaking down of the latter's monopoly of the political
system.
4.

The Demand for a Better Working Environment

To permit active participation of the democratic
parties, the political environment had to be improved.
Wang
noticed that the democratic parties lacked a stable working environment.
He cited the case of the Standing Committee of the
NPC as an example and disclosed three shortcomings in this area:
the Standing Committee had little knowledge of the conditions of
state affiars; there were a few substantive discussions and there
was little opportunity for contact.35 He asked for improvement.
Luo viewed the problem from another dimension -- organization development. He said that if the democratic parties hoped
to co-exist with the Communist Party in the long run, three problems should be tackled: how to develop their organizations, how
to take part in policy making conferences and how to improve the
work of the grass-roots level organization.
As for "long-term
co-existence," Luo took the stand that in the organization of the
democratic parties might find the conditions for co-existence,
but added that it was too early to talk about the problem of coexistence before the question of membership recruitment was
solved. The democratic parties were not allowed to recruit members from the masses of the workers and the peasants but only
from the old-style intellectuals who were by then quite old.
Since the road to socialism was a long one, the restriction of
their recruitment to the middle-aged and old persons would
deprive them of the longevity required for "long-term coexistence. •36
As a whole, it was impossible for the democratic parties to
play a greater role if the Communist Party refused to provide
them with stable and objective political environment.
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Since the advocacy for political change in the orientation
of democratization would endanger the dictatorship of Party rule,
Zhang, Luo and Zhu were widely attacked as reactionary, antiparty and anti-socialist. They were accused of opposing the dictatorship of the proletariat, opposing Party leadership and opposing the socialist road.
The latter two had long been considered by Mao as the core of the Communist regime that could not
be violated.
It was said that any opinions which denied Party
leadership or weakened Party leadership were incorrect.
The
speeches that deviated from orthodox socialism had to be rectified.
Ultimately, it was prescribed that all criticisms and
suggestions had to be raised on the basis of upholding socialism
and of consolidating Party leadership.37 According to this standard, Luo and Zhang's political suggestions were identified as
distrust of Party leadership (that is, the political design department and the Commission for rectifying injustice) and were
aimed at overthrowing the leadership position of the Communist
Party.
They were later accused of having formed an AntiCommunist alliance with a "political plot• to bring about the
capitalist system and were purged.
B.

Democratization in Deng's Era
Case Three -- The Beijing Spring
• • • Since for a period in the past democratic centralism was not carried out in the
true sense, centralism being divorced from
democracy, it is necessary to lay particular
emphasis on democracy at present •
• In
ideological and political life among the
ranks of the people, only democracy is permissible and not suppression or persecution
The constitutional rights of citizens
must be resolutely protected and no one has
the right to infringe upon them. In order to
safeguard people's democracy, it is imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system
so that democracy is systematized and written
into law in such a way as to ensure the
stability, continuity and full authority of
this democratic system and these laws.38
r

This unprecedented stress on democracy by the Communist regime,
together with the rehabilitation of the
Tian'anmen incidentn
inspired the hope for democratization which resulted in the socalled "Beijing Springn (Beijing Zhi Chun). 0 Beijing Springn was
a democratic movement, during which there was active participation in the big-character poster movement among young intellectuals and many unofficial publications appeared. Among them were
April 5th Tribune (Si Wu Luntan), Beijing Spring (Beijing Zhi
£h.!!!!) and Exploration (Tansuo). This section will focus on the
most representative figure active in this democratic movement,
Wei Jingsheng, since his viewpoints on democratization is the
most systematic and comprehensive.
0
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This democratic movement possesses two distinctive characteristics.
First, the majority of the participants were intellectual youths who grew up "under the red flag." Their family
backgrounds were mostly proletarian. Second, they did not superficially raise demands for freedom and democracy, but were more
realistic.
They looked to "socialist democracy and socialist
legality."
They believed that there was the need to consider
the necessity of democratization under the socialist system. For
them, democracy was indispensable to socialism: democracy is not
only the means but ought to be the end.
Thus, based on their
line of argument, the policy line of the state under socialism
must be the will of the great masses; socialist legality must be
perfected. For instance, there was a need to enact new laws for
publication, to use laws to protect people's democratic rights,
as well as the realization of supervision of the Party by the
masses so that the people could become the "real masters" under
socialism.
The Perspective of Wei Jingsheng towards Democracy
After the rise of Deng and the rehabilitation of the
"Tian'anmen Incident,•
under the slogan of "Four Modernizations,• Wei revealed his hopes for democratization to Deng. But
he was soon disillusioned and regretful:
the old political institutions that they (the people) abhorred refused change.
The
democracy and freedom for which they craved were not mentioned at
all, and nothing has been done to improve their living standards.39
Thus, he wrote a number of big-character posters on
democracy which he characterized as the "Fifth Modernization" to
arouse the aspirations of the people to struggle for democracy by
themselves. He was also the founder of Exploration (Tansuo). In
a series of big-character posters, he concentrated on disclosing
the dictatorial nature of the .Chinese Communist regime, pointing
out that democracy was the only hope for the success of modernization and better life and finally concluding that democracy
could only be achieved through the struggle of the people
themselves.
1.

Disclosing the Dictatorial Nature of the
Communist Reg ime

Wei radically pointed out that under the leadership of
the Communist party, the Chinese people could only have "democracy under a centralized leadership, • and this was not real democracy. Moreover, the people were always warned to be obedient.
According to Wei, "the slogan that the 'people are the masters of
history' has been turned into an empty phrase by the Party" because the people could not grasp their own fate in accordance
with the wishes of the majority.
Instead people were "good
slaves. •40
He directly said that the people in China did not
have democracy but they wished to and ought to be the masters of
their own destiny.
In fact, democracy has gone even within the
Party under the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat -indeed, it was one-man dictatorship of the "great leader. •41
Dictatorship had already violated Marxism:
the premise of
socialism is that the people or the prole tar ian masses are the
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masters of the country.
But what Chinese people had was a
Chinese-style socialist autocracy -- a feudalist monarchy under a
socialist cloak.42 Wei made a comparison between totalitarianism
and western democracy to highlight the dictatorial nature of the
Communist regime: a to tali tar ian way of rule restrains personality and makes slaves of the people whereas democracy is based
on a mixture of personalities. Totalitarianism is characterized
by its suppression of personality while freedom is identified by
its safeguards and blending of personality.43 To put it clearly,
Wei made it more explicit:
The people in the West enjoy abundant freedom, yet they are still not satisfied. The
Chinese people have already had a lot of discipline and someone still wants to give them
more.
Western governments take the protection of the 'citizens' human rights as one of
their bases; whereas the right of the
citizens in the 'socialist countries' is to
be servile subjects of a few.44
Wei ascribed totalitariansim to Marxism: democracy is only something the empty talkers of bourgeois society use to humble the
people, dictatorship is the only way for the people to go to obtain their rights to equality and freedom of living.45
He boldly and openly declared that China under the Communist
ideology was in fact a political dictatorship:
In our country as the result of a long period
of dictatorial rule under ideology of Marxism
and Maoism, workers, farmers, soldiers and
the masses have all lost every vestige of
political freedom • • •
By using the
superstition of
idealism in support of
apolitical to bring everything under social
control in a system of modern socialism, we
have reached a state in which the people are
deprived of all political rights and are enslaved and exploited in their daily life.46
In saying these words, Wei aimed at disclosing the undemocratic
and exploitative nature of Communist China. The hope was, in the
first step, to help people to realize that their country was indeed a totalitarian one.
2.

Democracy -- The Way for the Good Life

For Wei, democracy belongs to the people. If they ask
for democracy, they are merely asking for what originally belongs
to them. He described anyone (the Party leadership) who refused
to return democracy to them (the people) as a "shameless robber.•
Since democracy is the most formidable and irresistible enemy of
dictatorship, the only alternative for liberation from the yoke
of to tali tar ian ism is democracy -- people must first be the
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masters in distribution, including power and resources.
cy, according to Wei,

Democra-

• • • is to put power and authority under the
control of the entire working people.
In
this way the people have the right to select
their agents according to their own will' and
have things done in conformity with their
wishes and interests. In addition, they must
have the power to recall those agents any
time they want to, so as to prevent the
agents from riding rought and shod over the
people in their name.47
Wei voiced his goal as achieving the restoration of the people as
the masters of the country, and not as the modernized tools to
satisfy the expansionist ambitions of dictators.
From his observation of historical development, Wei reached
the conclusion that the economy of any nation with a highly developed democratic system usually has a rapid grow rate in production.
The reasons are:
{1) a free enterprise system1
(2)
distribution, both in power and resources, is determined by the
majority1 (3) free competition under the equal opportunity to
control production; and (4) conflicts can be peacefully resolved
by democratic politics.48
To Wei, democracy, freedom and happiness were the sole objectives for modernization. He asserted that without this •Fifth
Modernization, • the economic modernization would tend to be a
failure. So the political system of Communist China must first
be modernized and democracy must be put into practice before modernization can be achieved. Therefore he regarded that only if
•there is democracy, can there be the possibility and opportunity
to bring about equal human rights and the modernization of people's lives. •
This would arouse the democratic aspirations of
the people and point out the direction of life they ought to
pursue.
3.

The Achievement of Democracy by Struggle

Wei's assertion that •let's have confidence in our
strengths• and •human history is created by us• expressed his
disillusionment over the dream of achieving democracy through
Party leadership.
He thus entrusted his hope in the people's
common efforts: as long as the people can clearly discern objectives and impediments, they can overcome every obstacle and difficulty.
Since he never believed that the dictators would let
the people carry out democracy, he appealed for people to join
the battle in struggling for democracy:
Every single branch of twig and true and
valuable democracy has been saturated with
blood of martyrs and tyrants.
Each stride
towards democracy has led to withstand the
all-out assault of the reactionary forces.
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That democracy has been able to overcome all
these obstacles exactly throws light on its
preciousness to the people •
As long
as they [the Chinese people] find out their
right direction [that is, democracy], the
power of the tyrants will no longer be
undefeatable. 49
He denounced the traditional practice of hanging the hope
for better life on a handful of saviors:
two thousand years of
Chinese history tell us that a happy life cannot be secured by
relying on salvation by a small number of people. The only reliable guarantee for the happiness of the majority is to struggle
for a democratic social environment by themselves.
He negates
the Marxist theories in the pursuit of equality and democracy and
insists that equal rights can be obtained only in practical and
continual struggle in the evolution of human history.50
Ultimately in achieving democratization, Wei stressed the
importance of the rule of law. He felt that the system ought to
bring about equal rights to the people:
In the law-making process, the people should
heighten their vigilance and focus their attention on whether the law enacted is useful
to us in maintaining equal human rights.
Whoever attempts to stealthily change the
contents will be our enemy.51
In the final analysis, what he wanted was a democratic system
based on the rule of law in which people have the final say 1n
every aspect of social life.
In the fulfillment of this aim,
according to Wei, people must grasp the power of delegation and
supervision. Moreover the procedures and rights of election and
recall must be protected by law.
Wei's uncompromising attitude towards dictatorship and arbitrary rule was revealed in his article entitled "Democracy or New
Dictatorship?" The article was aimed at Deng because he criticized the big-character posters as disturbing the social and
political unity and stability which are pre-conditions for realizing the Four Modernizations.
Wei has bravely challenged
Deng's understanding of democracy and has claimed that if the
people do not possess the freedom of expression, how can there be
democracy. He further warned the people to be aware of Deng becoming a new dictator.
Indeed, the target of Wei was not only
the Party leadership, but the system as a whole -- democra tization of the political system in the orientation of the rule of
law was the only alternative to rescue China and its people from
poverty and slavery.
In comparison with the "contending" and "blooming" in 1957,
the speeches of those who participated in this democratic movement were far more forceful than the "rightists" of the late
1950s.
For example, Wei was quite blunt in stating that "Mao
Zedong thought is not much better than the medical plasters sold
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by quacks," and has portrayed the dictatorship of proletariat as
"feudalistic 100narchy under a socialist cloak." This, in fact,
was seen as a direct challenge to Party prestige. Wei's radical
and sharp criticisms were not tolerated by the Party. Thus Wei
was arrested on March 29, 1979.
Indeed during this period, many
"democratic elements" like Fu Yuehua were arrested.
But it is
important to notice that the "Beijing Spring" did not end in a
nation-wide suppression and large-scale political campaign like
that in 1957. This more or less, reflects a change of attitude
of the pragmatists toward legality. Finally, Wei was also "tried
formally."
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Chapter Five
Justice in the Application of Law
Justice is closely related to fairness and impartiality. At
the most general level, the function of the legal system should
reflect the society's perception of justice.l
In the law, the
term "justice" is used to cover the whole field of principles and
procedures that ought to be followed.2 In upholding justice, the
law protects rights. Thus a system of law is concerned with the
protection of rights. A law can be called unjust for failing to
meet the moral idea of justice. The same holds true for the administration of law if it fails to meet the standard of firmness
required by the procedures of the legal system. 3
The idea of
justice is to defend the rights of the individual, even a guilty
individual, against political utility.4 Generally speaking, in
the legal realm, standards of justice are supposed to be universal.
That is, the concept of justice is applicable to all and
trascends class limits.
Equal treatment for all is the basic
requirement.
A.

Justice under Mao

Mao believed that there was no such things as universal justice, but only "class justice":
bourgeois justice versus proletarian justice.
Long before 1949, the Chinese practiced
criminal justice from a class viewpoint.
Counterrevolutionary
elements from landlord-gentry, rich peasant and capitalist backgrounds were punished severely, while in general those from the
ranks of workers, peasants and toiling masses were treated with
leniency. The "Statute of the Chinese Soviet Republic Governing
Punishment of counterrevolutionaries• (1934) provided lighter
penalties for crimes committed by workers and peasants:
Workers and peasants who commit an offence
but are not leaders or major offenders may
have their punishment reduced
from that
stipulated in the various articles of this
statute composed to elements from the landlords and bourgeoisie who commit the same
class of offenses.
(Article 34)
Though it was no longer explicitly written in the law, criminal
justice based on class lines continued after the establishment of
the regime, which claimed to be a dictatorship of the proletariat.
In fact, socialist legality did not prevent the employment
of extra-ordinary measures against persons branded as class foes.
The adoption of a class viewpoint in the application of law
was unjust as referred to in Article 85 of the Constitution
(1954) which provided that "citizens of the PRC are equal before
law.• The distinction between the •people" and •enemies• as well
as the distinction between the two categories of contradiction in
handling legal cases were political considerations which violated
legal principles
since
they
were
subjected
to
different
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treatment. nideological offencesn -- that is, a criminal offence
in one's ideology reflected in one's writings, short of concrete
action, and one's historical background, which was also treated
as a source of evidence of crime -- were also regarded as unjust.
The prejudice towards the intellectuals was explicit when Mao
openly admitted that the masses might have some shortcomings, but
nthese are to be removed by means of criticism and selfcriticism, discussion as well as education within the ranks of
the people. n5
According
cases:

to the 1954 Constitution,

in handling criminal

The system of people's assessors applies, in
accordance with law, to judicial proceedings
in the people's courts.
[Article 75]
Cases in the People's courts are heard in
public unless otherwise provided by law. The
accused has the right to defense.
[Article
76] • • • in administering justice the People's courts are independent, subject only to
law. [Article 78]
Case One -- The Incident of the
Hu Feng Counterrevolutionary Cligue
1.

Politicization of the Issue

The incident (contradiction) had been transformed from the
ideological level to the political level through the utilization
of public opinion with Party direction and mobilization behind
the case. The target was later extended to Hu's friends.
a.

The First Stage -- Ideological Criticism

From October 1954 to March 1955, the criticisms on the
•apinion• were restricted to the ideological realm. They focused
on the discussion of whether Hu was a true Marxist or not.
Zhou Chengchang alleged that Hu was not a areal Marxistn who
employed a wujieii (classless) perspective to treat the question
of literature.&
Cai Yi pointed out that the fundamental difference between
Marxist literary ideology and Hu' s bourgeois idealist literary
ideology rested in the latter's denial that socialist realist
writers •must possess the proletarian standpoint and Marxist
viewpoint.•
He thus concluded that Hu's literary theory was
•idealistic,• •anti-people,• and nanti-realism.a7 Bao Chang held
the similar view. He attacked Hu's literary theory as being of a
capitalist nature and said that Hu resisted the Party's literary
line in the name of Marxism-Leninism.8
Mao Dun, the Minister of Cultural Department and the Chairman of All-china Federation of Literary and Art Circles, then
launched the most comprehensive critic ism on Hu' s ideology. He
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charged that the literary theory of Hu was plagued with
subjectivism, and that it was the negation of the importance of
the proletarian world view on the part of the writers. Accordingly, Hu's ideology was labeled as bourgeois subjectivism in
Marxism color. His literary line had long been contradictory to
that of Mao, and his activities were that of sectarianism.9
b.

Political Accusation and Broadening of the Scope of
Struggle
i.

Anti-Party Stage

The publication of Guo Moruo's article entitled Fan Shehui
Zhuyi Di Hu Feng Gangling (Hu Feng 's Anti-Socialist Program) on
April 1, 1955 in the Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) marked the
change of the incident from an ideological one to a political
one. In the last point of the charge Hu was accused of attempting to deny Party leadership by suggesting the dismissal of the
unified organization of the literary circle. Guo concluded that
Hu's program was •anti-Party• and •anti-people• which indeed
paved the way for the imposition of the charge of counterrevolutionary crimes on Hu and his clique. The escalation of the incident from the ideological and literary sphere to the political
sphere simply by utilizing public opinion without in-depth investigation was indeed unfair.
The publication of Hu 's self-criticism together with his
letter to She Wu before liberation served as evidence to prove
that Hu's circle was an •anti-Party clique.• Especially misleading was the editorial remark added to Hu's self-criticism.
In
fact
the editorial remarks which were said to be written by
Maol6 implied that the Party rejected Hu' s self-criticisms and
pointed out the direction of proceedings of the issue. Moreover,
the headlines and concluding remarks given before and after the
letters as well as the •interpretation• of the key words in the
letters were intended to direct the readers to the Party tracks
and to inform the writers of the standpoint and attitude of the
Party in handling the issue.
Finally, She Wu's criticism of Hu Feng was only a personal
accusation without any legal ground. After that, the Party mobilized all the pro-Party writers to launch personal attacks on Hu
which had already transcended the limits of ideological contention. He was denied self-defense. The slogan at that time was
•Enhance One's Vigilance, Disclose Hu Feng. •11
The editorial
remark on May 18, 1955 in Renmin Ribao pointed out that Hu Feng
and the elements of the clique were •pretending to support but in
fact were opposing the people, and were pretending to support the
revolution but in fact were opposing the revolution. •1"2 This
remark already highlighted the ultimate aim of the Party. There
were many articles writ ten attacking Hu and his friends in the
Tianjin Da Gong Bao, Renmin Ribao, and Guangming Ribao. Among
these articles, the most notable was also written by Guo and advocated that •au Feng should be dealt with according to the law.•
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ii.

The •counterrevolutionary• Stage

Zhang Tianyi's article nThis Is the Struggle Between Revolution and Counterrevolution• first transformed the issue into a
struggle between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries. The
Party also mobilized cultural circles through the press to conduct conferences to condemn Hu:
May 17 in Canton, May 20 in
Shanghai, and May 21 at Peking University. Then there came the
publication of the •Materials on the Hu Feng Anti-Party Clique,
Part II,• and the Joint Conference of the Federation and the
Union presided by Guo Moruo on May 25. A resolution was passed
on the grounds that Hu Feng was •a hidden counterrevolutionary
element within literary circles•:
1.

According to the article 4 of the Const i tution of the Chinese Writers' Union, Hu was
expelled and dismissed the directorship in
the Union and
the editorial member of
•People's Literature.•

2.

Hu was dismissed from Committee Membership in
the National Committee of All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles.

3.

A suggestion was made to the Standing Committee of NPC, based on article 38 of the Constitution, to dismiss Hu's qualifications as
a delegate to the NPC.

4.

The suggestion was made to the Supreme
People's Procuratorate:
the counterrevolutionary crime of Hu must be dealt with.

5.

The resolution prescribed that the elements
of Hu Feng Clique in the ~ederation and Union
must stand out to disclose Hu, conduct selfcriticism, and reform themselves.
Whether
their membership will be preserved or not
would depend on the condition of their concrete action.l3

May 31 marked another stage of the event when the slogan was
changed to •Firmly and Thoroughly Crush Hu Feng's Counterrevolutionary Clique• in the Renmin Ribao. Attacks were broadened to
include Hu's friends like Liu Xuefeng, and Zhang Yu. The whole
issue culminated in the publication of •Materials concerning Hu
Feng 's Counterrevolutionary Clique, Part III. •
It is worthy to
note from the title that the term •anti-Party• was changed to
•counterrevolutionary.• This time, the Party mobilized those who
were far more important than those within the literary circles.
Articles in the June 11th Renmin Ribao were written by Li Jishen,
Chairman of Revolutionary Committee of Kuomentang: Shen Junru,
Acting Chairman of China Democratic League; Ma Xulun, Chairman of
China Association for Promoting Democracy; Peng Zemin, Vice
Chairman of Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party; Chen
Qiyou, Vice Chairman of China Zhi Gong Dang: Li Chunqing, Taiwan
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Democratic Self-Government; Xi Yao Jia Nuo, Acting President of
Chinese Buddhist Association.
On June 12, the Communists again
changed the slogan to "Firmly Liquidate the Hu Feng Clique and
Hidden Counterrevolutionaries."
Since the crime of Hu Feng's clique was elevated from antiParty to Counterrevolutionary, in the Communist regime, the counterrevolutionary had to be suppressed. On this basis, Hu and his
friends were no longer in the category of "people"; the contradiction was being transformed into an antagonistic one which
could not be solved by self-criticism or education but by
struggle.
Indeed, literary dissent ought to be resolved within the
sphere of literature, it is not justified to raise the ideological question into a political crime. The logic had gone too far.
2.

Counterrevolutionary Crime on the Basis of "Ideological
Offenses"

Hu's "Opinions" had undoubtedly shown the differences of
ideological and policy orientations from the Party, yet Hu's action was limited to verbal disagreement with Party control.
In
Hu's "Opinions," he launched his own criticisms on the present
conditions of the literary circle.
His suggestion was intended
to "rescue" the literary circle from the dogmatic thinking and
factionalism, and he "hoped" the Party would take measures to
reverse the trend.
It was correct that Hu and Mao had different
interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist theory of literature, but
it was difficult to distinguish whose version was the correct
one. Indeed, this was open to debate: Hu was liberally-oriented
while Mao was politically oriented.
Yet in Communist China,
where power politics prevailed, Mao was surely in the authoritative position.
He, as Liu Shaoqi once said in 1942, was the
"only" legitimate interpreter of Marxism-Leninism in Communist
China.
Under this condition, any contradiction of Mao's version
was treated as possessing the nature of "petty-bourgeois" world
view or even counterrevolutionary.
Even Hu's understanding of
Marxism-Leninism was incorrect, it was still the question within
the ideological realm.
It was already too harsh to charge Hu as
an ideological enemy to the Party.
On no grounds could Hu be
accused as a political enemy since he never took any political
actions to sabotage the regime.
The charge of "double-faced
tactics"l4 was only a weak and vague substitution for that of
counterrevolutionary crime.
The proposal made by Hu from the perspective of the Party
might be a direct challenge of Party's supreme power which had no
precedence.
Although Hu 's proposals were somewhat radical -their aim was to minimize, if not to eliminate, the Party control
over the literary circle -- his suggestions were made on paper
only.
He had not taken any steps to undermine Party leadership.
Though his plan could be treated as reactionary, it was short of
concrete action that could be transfomred into counterrevolutionar~
crimes.
Under the "Act," the counterrevolutionary crime
wh1ch related to speech is found in Article 10 (3):
"Engaging in
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counterrevolutionary propaganda in manufacturing and spread
rumors.
• But Hu's "Opinions" were submitted only to the
Party. Never had he taken action to publicize his "Opinions" in
the form of a leaflet or propaganda.
Hu even notified his
friends and followers about his action and the content of the
letters.
Still the Party could not charge Hu since his letter
had been "formally" submitted to the Party which resembled the
practice of appeal.
In reviewing the Hu Feng incident, the Party accused Hu of
being a counterrevolutionary simply on the grounds of the incorrectness of Hu's ideological perspective on literature's role in
the Party, and the reactionary nature of the proposal he had
made. This was in fact a question of ideology -- that is, the
imprisonment or execution of anyone whose ideology is considered
as offensive (or "ideologically offensive"). It was the "Hu Feng
Incident" that set a precedent for "ideological offenses" and
•crimes derived from one's speech or writings" as interpreted by
the Party. This was the case in the "Anti-Rightist Movement."
Throughout Hu 's case, the Party lacked substantive evidence to
prove that Hu and his clique had taken actions which were "for
the purpose of overthrowing the people's democratic regime and
undermining the people's democracy." The case had reflected the
political nature in the application of law in Communist China.
3.

Historical Background As a Source of Accusation

As the event became more politicized and escalated under the
slogan of "Firmly and Thoroughly Crush the Hu Feng counterrevolutionary Clique," the Party in publishing the private letters
between Hu and his friends, began to trace their historical background.
This was to be the evidence to support the clique's
counterrevolutionary attempt.
At the same time the charge had
been changed from "anti-Party• to "counterrevolutionary, n which
expressed the change of the attitude of the Party toward the
issue. In the editorial remark in the June lOth Renmin Ribao, a
commentator wrote:
1.

Hu Feng
in the first revolutionary
civil war, had once joined the Communist
Youth League.
In 1925, when he was in
Peking, under the threat of the rule of white
terror of Duan Qishui, had firmly demanded
the Party permission for withdrawal from the
league.

2.

Later in the KMT army, he had prepared antiCommunist political works and then went to
Japan and engaged in sinister tasks.

3.

After his return, he sneaked into the leftist
cultural body and conducted factional and
destructive activities.

- 88 -

4.

During the Hunan and Congqing periods, he had
connections with many heads of KMT secret
agencies.

Based on this background knowledge, it was said of Hu that "before liberation, he had hidden in the mainland and continued to
conduct more sinister counterrevolutionary activities. "1 One of
Hu's closest friends had also served as a military officer of the
KMT.l6
The editorial remarks,
in reporting their "reactionary
political background," were aimed at strengthening their argument
that they were in essence "counterrevolutionary."
But this
evidence was not strong in a legal sense.
On the other hand,
these "facts" were history, and it was difficult to distinguish
whether they were strategic plays or not.
On the other hand,
there was no evidence of a connection between Hu's clique and the
KMT after the liberation.
All these inferences are attenuated.
In fact, when the backgrounds of the top Communist leadership
were reviewed, most of them, including Mao, had once acted as the
KMT officers. The headings added among the letters were intended
to disclose their reactionary nature.
Yet in a legal sense,
one's intentions cannot be guessed to serve as evidence.
On June 20, 1955, the Renmin Ribao published the family
background of Hu.
The title was "Hu Feng's Attitudes Towards a
Landlord Family as Evidence of His Counterrevolutionary Standpoint." The article pointed out that "Hu's family is a family of
counterrevolutionary landlords." Thus Hu was said to be "either
a spy of the imperialistic KMT, a Trotskyist, or a traitor of the
Communist Party. nl7
All these materials attempted to confirm
Hu's counterrevolutionary standpoint from a historical and social
approach.
This method of tracing one's family background and
social history was a general practice of the CPC in proving one's
reactionary nature.
But too heavy a reliance and reference to
background is misleading and most of the time inaccurate, irrelevant and unfair.
4.

Lack of Legal Actions and Violation of Legal Practices

The whole case was handled by a political rather than legal
approach from the time Hu was accused as "anti-Party" to the
final conclusion that he and his clique were "counterrevolutionary." Not only was action lacking, numerous violations of legal
practice and procedures also occurred.
With regard to the lack of legal procedure, the most notable
omission was that no investigation was conducted by a People's
Public Security organ which was supposedly to perform this function whether there was any trial.
Moreover, there were violations of legal practices and procedures in handling the case
under the Party's direction.
In the first instance, it was illegal to label Hu and his faction as an "anti-Party Clique" and a
"counterrevolutionary clique" at the Party's whim before they
were tried by the People's Court according to legal procedures.
Second, even if the trial was going to take place, it was unfair
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for the Party to utilize propaganda and public op1n10n to exert
pressure on the accused and to influence the "would-be" decision
of the court.
Third, the evidence ought to have been kept in
strict confidentiality before the trial and presented to the
court only.
Fourth, the joint-conference of the Federation and
the Union was not in the position to determine that Hu had already committed the counterrevolutionary crime. Fifth, it was a
violation of Hu 's legal rights to deny Hu and his clique the
chance to defend their constitutional rights.
Sixth, it was a
legal abuse that the party made the final judgment. Stated Mao,
"Hu Feng and his clique are indeed spokesmen for all counterrevolutionary classes, groups, and individuals."
Finally, the
imprisonment of Hu Feng violated his right of freedom of person
since it was not based on a decision made by the court.
The Fate of Hu Feng and His Friends
On July 18, the Secretary of the NPC, Peng Zhen, announced
that Hu Feng had been arrested "according to the law" under Article 37 of the Constitution:
No deputy to the National People's Congress
may be arrested or placed on trial without
the consent of the National People's Congress
or, when the National People's Congress is
not in session, of its Standing Committee.
This was done under the request of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.
After that backbone elements such as A Long, Lu
Ling, Liu Xuewei, Chang Zhongzhao, Lu Diau, Fang Ran, and others
totalling 130 people were arrested.l8
In 1956, Hu Feng was
placed in Qin Cheng prison without investigation a!ld trial.
In
1958 Mao issued a directive ordering a trial for Hu.
But since
the incident was so politicized, it was difficult to adjudicate.
The verdict was not rendered until 1965 and Hu was finally sentenced to twelve years imprisonment.l9 Indeed the trial was only
a formalistic one.
Case Two -- The Anti-Rightist Campaign
The original idea of the "blooming" and "contending" was to
reduce the tension between the Party and the intellectuals. But
the criticisms advanced by the intellectuals were aimed at the
whole political system and its orthodox ideology, and even went
as far as attacking the ruling policies.
In short, criticisms
were voiced by nearly all sectors of society against the Communist regime. A similar strategy was employed against the leading figures of the intellectuals a·s in the Hu Feng incident. The
chief target was the Zhang-Luo "anti-communist" Alliance.
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1.

The Employment of a Political Campaign Against the
In te llec tuals

In reaction to the accusations and hostile criticisms, Zhou
Enlai, in the Fourth Session of the First National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China denounced these criticisms as "vicious slander" against the regime. Thus they were
"counterrevolutionary" and could not be tolerated by the Party:
At present, some rightists have used the excuse of rectification to launch destructive
attacks against the Party. Many of the attacks are aimed at our political system.
They attack our political system from the
capitalist perspective. They accuse the People's democratic dictatorship as the root of
all mistakes and shortcomings. They attempt
to discredit our political system. They try
to establish some kind of state organs, for
example, the Political Design Department, the
Commission for Rectifying Injustices, aside
from our highest state organ -- the National
People's Congress.
Their objective is to
separate the state authority from the working
class and its vanguard -- Party leadership ••
• • This kind of anti-socialist speech cannot
be considered as criticism out of good will.
The aim of the rightist is to pull our
political system off the socialist road onto
a capitalist road. This cannot be allowed by
the public.20
The brief blooming period was followed by the Party's AntiRightist counter-offence. The campaign was an unjust one since
it marked the violation of the promise of the Communist Party
before the rectification -- that is, the principle of "blame not
the speaker but be warned by his words."
An editorial entitled "Why This?" in Renmin Ribao on June 8,
1957 formally raised the curtain on the anti-rightist struggle -against so-called "anti-Party, anti-Socialist" speeches. Indeed
the momentum, nature as well as target of the campaign were directed by editorials in Renmin Ribao. Politicization and escalation of the issues to political and class struggle were the basic
strategies -- the unnecessary intensification of the issues which
were Jriginally non-criminal in nature. Besides that, the Party
also mobilized public opinion against leading figures among the
rightists: at first the "Zhang-Lo Alliance" and then the •antiParty Clique" formed by Ding Ling and Chen Qixu -- a repeat of
the Hu Feng Incicent.
The Party used the excuse of an anonymous letter which attacked Lou Yuwen, a pro-Communist in the democratic party, to
ignite the struggle. The Party alleged that the verbal attack
signified that some people were trying to take the opportunity of
recitification to launch class struggle against the Communists.
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The editorial concluded that within our country, class struggle
was still carrying on, so "we must employ the perspective of
class struggle to interpret the present phenomenon in order to
obtain the correct conclusion."21 Thus the Party took the action
against those who criticized the regime and transformed the
counter attack as a class struggle against the ideological
enemies.
The targets as highlighted by the editorial at that
time were those who "ascribe to the Western style of politics,"
that is, Zhang and Luo, the most influential non-Communist intellectuals at that time. They both leaned toward the democratization of the regime.
On June 14, the editorial entitled "Is It a Question of
Political Stand?" pointed out those criticisms which denied the
achievement of socialism departed from a non-socialist political
stand.
This implied the "critics" were "anti-socialist."
On
June 29, the editorial defined what was "right": those speeches
and actions which hindered the unity among the people, obstructed
the socialist reform and construction, and weakened the people's
democratic dictatorship.22 This definition served as the political standard for the Communists to identify those who were the
"rightists." Zhang and Luo were now named as the chief targets
for the struggle.
"The Unusual Spring" had openly pointed out
the ultimate intentions of the "rightists":
"to attack the
socialist system, overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat
and Party leadership.n23 On July 28, the editorial claimed that
the "Anti-Rightist Struggle is a great socialist revolution on
political and ideological front" which was said to be a life and
death "struggle." The struggle was also brought into the Party
against the "rightist" Party members -- Ding and Chen. The AntiRightist campaign was greatly intensified by the editorial entitled "Anti-Rightist Struggle Is an Important Test for Each Party
Member," which implied that all Party members had' to devote themselves totally in the struggle.
It was the September 15
editorial which explained why the capitalist rightists were
reactionaries who formally transformed the contradiction between
the rightists and the people into an antagonistic one.
The attack on Zhang and Luo started on June 10 when Wu Han
expressed that Zhang, Luo and Zhu 's opinions did not represent
the political stand of the Democratic League, and their opinions
ought to be criticized.
As from the very beginning, the issue
was already treated as a political question. As Wu said, "Their
opinions have already deviated from Party leadership, the direction of which was anti-socialist."24 The method employed was to
expose their past mistakes by their colleageus.
Zhang was accused of having a strong capitalist tendency
because of his admiration of the capitalist system. The accusation rested on the ground that Zhang mentioned tranforming the
NPC and the CPPCC into a bicameral system which takes after the
Western representative political system. He had made a positive
comment about the capitalist system:
We cannot belittle capitalism.
At
many have denounced the capitalist
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present
system.

In fact, capitalism also has its vigor. Why?
Because there is a multi-Party system, a democratic system, a House of Representatives, a
Senate, a ruling Party and Opposition Party.
Capitalism has its merits which are
checks and balances as well as mutual
supervision. n25
More severely, Zhang was implicitly attacked as anti-Party
leadership since he was politically ambitious and possessed a
strong reactionary nature.
This was shown by his treatment of
the CPWDP (China Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party) as his
sphere of influence and thus his political asset. Moreover, he
had never forgotten the third line -- anti-Marxist Reformism.26
Luo was also said to be fundamentally anti-communist in light of
his persistent opposition to the leadership of the CPC.
In addition to the political alliance formed by Zhang and
Luo being affirmed, the political ambition of the alliance was
said to sabotage the leadership of the CPC. Thus the Zhang-Luo
alliance was anti-party and anti-Communist. Most significant of
all, Shen Diaoxu, the Chairman of the Democratic League, launched
a political criticism camapign against Zhang and Luo:
The mistake committed by the two leading figures of Democratic League, that is, Zhang and
Luo, was a question of political stand, and
not only ideological.
They on the surface
support
socialism,
but
in
fact
oppose
socialism. They on the surface support the
CPC, but in fact despise the CPc.27
Indeed, most of the accusations were grounded on subjective
interpretation, exaggeration and deduction, and lacked concrete
evidence.
Pressure exerted on them was through the Democratic League
manipulated by the CCP. Zhang and Luo were forced to admit there
was an "anti-Communist" alliance between them, which harbored the
ambition and a plot to control the Democratic League and Literary
circle, and finally to overthrow socialism.
This led to the
self-criticism of Zhang and Luo.
In fact, their confessions
under large-scale personal attack and public pressure were extralegal.
Deng Xiaoping 's report "On Rectification Campaign• of September 23, 1957 marked the end of the Anti-Rightist campaign. In
the report, Deng concluded that "after more than three months'
struggle, the conditions have been tremendously changed. Within
the democratic parties, tertiary school, intellectual circle and
organs in the provinces, the struggle has already gained decisive
victory." He said that "as the struggle has ended, emphasis is
to be put on thought reform and ideological education.•

- 93 -

2.

The Redefinition of the "Principle" and "Ideological
Accusation"

In replying to whether the Party violated the basic principle of "blooming" and "contending," Guo Moruo quibbled that
"non-crimina! speakers were non-crimina!, and crimina! speakers
were criminal."28 He said that when one's words shocked the very
foundation of the regime, how could the person still be innocent?29
Thus only criticisms based on goodwill could be accepted.
Indeed the editorial on June 29 set the limits for
"blooming" and "contending": it could not surpass the locus of
supporting the Communist Party and building socialism. Guo also
confirmed that the struggle against the rightists was a political
and ideological struggle.
Guo's assertions at least reflected
two things which were unfair to the intellectuals. The first one
was that the Party never set the limits for criticisms before
Guo's explanation as well as the June 29 editorial.
Yet there
still was no discernible criterion for distinguishing whether one
was criminal before he launched his criticisms.
It was rather
the nature of the speeches as interpreted by the Party that
determined whether one was a criminal or not.
In fact Guo explained nothing on that point. It only showed the arbitrariness
of the Communist rule. The second one was the open confirmation
that speeches and ideological differences could also be a source
of crime (there was no separation of political and criminal
crimes in Mao's China).
The formula for determining whether one's actions were
criminal was puzzling: when one was displeased with the leadership he was opposing the leadership; opposing leadership was opposing
organiation;
opposing
organization
was
anti-Party;
anti-Party was anti-people; anti-people was in fact counterrevolutionary.30 This was a Stalinist method of dictatorial suppression.
The same was true for equating anti-Communist with
anti-socialist, and anti-socialist with anti-people.
The explanation was quite ridiculous:
Socialism is the result of victory over
capitalist class and of the overthrow of
capitalism by the working masses under the
leadership of the Communist Party.
The aim
of socialism is to destroy the capitalist
class, to reform the petty bourgeoisie and to
eliminate the possibility of the capitalist
restoration.
There would be no proletarian
victory and dictatorship of the proletariat
as well as socialism .if there was no leadership of the Communist Party.
Because of
this, the socialism in the world was led by
the Communist Party, and only under the
leadership of Communist Party.
All antiCommunist governments of the capitalist class
in the world are anti-socialist. From this,
we know that the leadership of the Communist
Party was the best guarantee for socialist
construction.
Socialism is supported not
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only by the proletariat, but also by the
broadest working people.
• • Socialism is
the highest will and the best interest of the
people.
So Anti-Socialism is anti-people.
Anti-Communist,
anti-socialism
and
antipeople were inexorably connected.31
The logic seems to be misleading. The whole process of deduction
is based on many assumptions which have not yet been or can
hardly be verified.
For example, it negates the concept of
patriotism and nationalism as well as equating the Party to the
state.
Employing this formula to prove that intellectuals were
guilty was in fact more political than legal.
3.

Historical Background as a Source of Accusation

In order to prove the Zhang-Luo alliance was anti-Party and
anti-socialist, the leadership of the De100cratic League traced
back
their
political
history
to
show
their
reactionary
background.
Wang Yixun pointed out that Zhang had a reactionary family
background and a bourgeois educational background.
Zhang was
born in a landlord family and he had received "European bourgeois
education and his brain is full of Western De100cracy. n3T In
reviewing the political career of Zhang, Li Bazhu had concluded
that Zhang had the political ambition to share China with the
Communists:
•
He intended to control south of Yangtze
River as his political asset.
He predicted
that Chiang [Kai-shek], under the American
support, could still maintain control over
Jiang Zhe [The Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces]. He felt that under such conditions,
he could organize a coalition government with
the Chinese Communists • • • His intention
was to divide China by three powers.33
Based on his attitude towards the Communist revolution, Zhang was
accused that he was never pro-Communist, but even anti-Communist
and had his own political line. According to Yan Xinmin:
Zhang told people that 'you are afraid of
contradicting the CPC. What I say is to compete with the CPC.'
M9reover, Zhang praised
Chiang, and despised the CPC. He intended to
play a
balancing
role
between
the
two
Parties.
Zhang's political ambition and individual interest brought him to openly hate
the Communist revolution, and the CPC.
He
especially despised those CPC members within
the De100cratic League.
Zhang had once insulted Mao in stating 'Mao is the first big
rogue in Chinese history.'34

- 95 -

Qu Tunan wrote an article which spelled out the reactionary
political history of Luo Lungzhi.
In the article, he said that
Luo had a landlord family background.
Moreover, Luo was proAmerican. He wanted to cultivate a third force based on American
support to replace Chiang. Also, Luo always conducted anti-Party
and anti-Socialist speeches and actions which were evidenced by
his class nature and the class education he had received. Finally, Luo had persistently been pro-Amercan and against the Soviet
Union:
For example, in 1956, Chiang and America
signed the Sino-American trading treaty. Luo
said that the treaty was an equal one. When
the people of Shanghai held a conference to
repudiate the treaty, Luo was discontent with
the motion.
In 1957, the Democratic League
held a conference in Hong Kong. The resolution passed was to oppose Arne r ican imper ialism, to overthrow Chiang and to respond to
the land reform called by the Chinese Communists and to join the CPPCC. Luo did not
accept this resolution, and still kept in
contact with American imperialists and insisted on a middle line and advocated peace
talks. In 1949, Luo attempted to change the
Chinese foreign policy of "learning to oneside. n35
Shang Jicheng accused Zhang and Luo of taking part in antiCommunist actions in the past:
In 1948, Zhang wrote a letter from Shanghai
to oppose the resolution of the Democratic
League. This resolution made it clear that
the Democratic League was going to cooperate
with the CPC, to go on the same road, to
overthrow Chiang's reactionary government,
and to oppose American imperialism. In late
1948, the Central Committee of the CPC called
for the conference of the CPPCC. At that
time the Democratic League was drafting and
discussing the new CPPCC platform. Among
them were two: one was to use New Democracy
as the guiding ideology, and another one was
to admit the leadership of the CPC. But no
conclusion was reached in the discussion.
This was mainly due to the objection from
Zhang in Hong Kong and Luo in Shanghai.36
The detailed exposure of Zhang-Luo's political and social
history to substantiate the Communist charge was the usual practice of the Party. But this had a profoundly negative influence
on criminal justice in respect to Zhang and Luo.
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4.

Violation of Legal Procedures

The CPC did not take any legal action to investigate the
•anti-Party" and "anti-Socialist• nature of the intellectuals
before the intellectuals were labelled as "rightist. •
Neither
were there any trials.
Most of the actions taken by the Communist Party violated the same legal procedures as in the Hu Feng
incident.
For example, the Democratic League was not in the
position to make the decision that Zhang and Luo were •antiParty" and "anti-Communist• simply based on their interpretation
of Zhang-Luo's speeches and past history. Moreover, it was illegal to label Zhang, Luo and many intellectuals as rightists before they were tried by a People's Court. It was also unfair for
the Party to utilize the propaganda and public opinions to exert
pressure on the accused and to influence the •would-be" decision
of the court. The trial of Lin Xiling serves as a good example.
She was found guilty of counterrevolutionary activity by a court
which was considered a formalistic one.
"The Resolution of the State Council Concerning the Question
on Labor Re-education" passed by the NPC on August 1, 1957, was
aimed at the "rightists• who had emerged during the short-lived
"Hundred Flowers Movement.• Article One applied to:
Those crimes which are not serious, those
counterrevolutionaries, anti-socialist reactionary
elements
who
are
exempted
from
criminal accusation, and those who have been
expelled by the units like organs, organizations, enterprises and schools.37
This practice was considered as "violating socialist legality. •
An editorial in the Soviet government newspaper Izvesta declared:
In the vigorous movement against so-called
"rightist" and "right-leaning opportunities,"
large-scale suppression was carried out. On
August 1, 1957, the State Council of China
passed a decision concerning re-education
through labor.
This decision granted administrative agencies the power to confine
almost any Chinese citizens indefinitely in
special camps without investigation and trial. • • • Several hundred thousand people
were thus suppressed.38
The crimes of Zhang and Luo's •anti-Communist alliance• were
"conducting anti-Communist activities," and "plotting to overthrow the present regime.
They were also dismissed from their
posts as deputies to the NPC.
All those intellectuals who criticized Party rules were accused of being either •r ightists" or "counterrevolutionaries. •
Virtually all sectors of the country were involved in the AntiRightist campaign.
Thereafter, the Communist Party insisted
strongly that the intellectuals had to be continually subject to
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ideological reform.
grew.
B.

The Party's distrust

in the

intellectuals

Justice under Deng

Communist China under Deng has shown its resolution to reform the past practice of lawlessness in Mao's era.
Under the
presupposition of strengthening socialist legality, it is stipulated that any offender must be dealt with in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the Constitution and law. There is also
the reassert ion of "the equality of all people before the law"
and public trial. These are aimed at the realization of impartiality and universality (or uniformity) of socialist legality
which was denied in the past.
The trial of Wei Jingsheng was
conducted under this new consideration.
In fact, he was the
first democratic element that was tried publicly since the rise
of the democratic movement in China in late 1978. This section
will analyze the handling of this case from two aspects, that is,
procedure and substance, to examine justice in the application of
law.
Case Three -- The Trial of Wei Jingsheng
The trial of Wei took place on October 16, 1978.
1.

Procedure

The procedural aspects of Wei's trial will be discussed in
four dimensions:
(1) legal authorityi {2) public triali (3) the
right to defensei and (4) the right to appeal.
a.

Legal Authority

Although the new Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal pro-·
cedure were already approved by the Second Session of the Fifth
NPC in late June 1979, these laws were not put into effect until
1980.
Thus the Act for the Punishment of Counterrevolution
(hereinafter "Act") promulgated in 1951 and the 1978 Constitution
became the source of law for prosecution. There was disagreement
over why the trial did not take place until 1980 since most of
the provisions in the "Act" were outdated. Moreover, there was
no law of criminal procedure to adhere to. All these would affect justice in the course of handling the case.
Nevertheless
the trial had been conducted on the legal basis of the Constitution and the "Act.•
Legal Sources of Arrest and Trial
Article 47 of the 1978 Constitution provides that:
No citizen may be arrested except by the
decision of a people's court or with the
sanction of a people's procuratorate, and the
arrest must be made by a public security
organ.

- 98 -

Accordingly, Wei was arrested by a Beijing public security organ
on May 29, 1979 after the approval of the Beijing people's
procuratorate.
After the completion of the investigation, the trial was
conducted by the court with the Beijing procuratorate as the
prosecutor. Articles 41 and 43 grant "local people's courts at
various levels and special people's court [the power to] exercise
judicial authority" and "local people's procuratorates and
special people's procuratorates [the power to] exercise procuratorial authority within the limit prescribecd by law. • Thus the
procedures for arrest and prosecution found their source in the
Constitution.
The Legal Source of the Prosecution and Adjudication
The alleged crimes committed by Wei were:
1.

Supplying foreigners with military information.
The
accused Wei Jingsheng, shortly after the Chinese
launched the self-defensive counterattack against the
Vietnamese aggression of February 1979 supplied a foreigner with military intelligence including the names
of the commanders, the number of Chinese troops, the
developments of the fighting at the front and the number of casualties.39
By supplying a foreigner with
military information, Wei had committeed the counterrevolutionary crime specified in Article 6 of the
"Act":
"Stealing or giving out government secrets or
providing internal and external enemies with secret
information. •
(first clause)

2.

Carrying out counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation.
During the period between December 1978 and
March 1978, Wei had written and distributed reactionary
articles including, "The Fifth Modernization -- Democracy and Others.," a sequel and second sequel to "The
Fifth Modernization -- Democracy and Others" and "Human
Rights, Equality and Democracy." These articles slandered Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought and advocated
the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat
and the socialist system and the seizure of state
power.40
Article Two of the "Act" prescribed that
"persons committing crimes for the purpose of overthrowing the people's democratic regime and undermining
the people's democracy shall be punished in accordance
with this present "Act." According to law, those activities aimed at overthrowing the regime of the proletariat and socialist system and endangering the PRC
were counterrevolutionary crimes.
Since Wei agitated
for such purposes, he had committed the crime of carrying out counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation
specified in Article 10: "Instigating the mass to show
resistance to governemnt action in the purchase of
foodstuffs and levying of taxes, to refuse to carry out
conscription duties and perform military service, to
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sabotage and to refuse to execute the orders of the
people's government," (section 1) "Sowing dissension
and hostility among the nationalities, democratic classes, parties and people's organizations, or undermining
the unity of the people and the government," (section
2) and "engaging in counterrevolutionary agitation,
fabricating and spreading false rumors" (section 3).41
The Adjudication
The chief judge announced that Wei had betrayed the country
by supplying the foreigner with military information.
He also
violated the Constitution in writing reactionary articles and
engaging in counterrevolutionary activity.
The nature of the
crime was extremely serious. In order to safeguard the socialist
system, to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and to
protect the smooth process of socialist modernization, it was
necessary to suppress destructive counterrevolutionary activities.
Wei was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and was
deprived of political rights for another three years after serving this sentence under Article Two, and Article Six, sections
One and Two, which provide:
Persons
who
have
committed
an
act
of
espionage, or acts aiding the enemy mentioned
below are subject to the death penalty, life
imprisonment, or under extenuating circumstances, a prison term of 5 years or more
(Article Six) •
The Court also invoked Article Ten, sections Two and Three, which
provide:
Persons who have committed for counterrevolutionary purposes one of the following
crimes aimed at incitement and provoking discontent are subject to imprisonment for a
term of three years or more and, under aggravating circumstances, to death penalty or
life imprisonment~
as well as Articles Sixteen and Seventeen of the
provide:

0

Act," which

Persons who have committed other crimes for
counterrevolutionary purposes that are not
specified in this Regulation are subject to
the crimes which most closely resemble those
specified in this Act.
(Article 16) Persons
who have committed crimes specified in this
Act will be deprived of political rights and
their propertyf wholly, or in part.
(Article 17).~:
Thus both the prosecution aud the adjudication of Wei were
based on the •Act.•
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b.

Public Trial

According to the 1978 Constitution, •All cases in the
people's courts are heard in public except those involving
special circumstances as prescribed by law.• (Article 41)
There is doubt as to whether the trial was really an •open•
one in the Western sense, yet in comparison with past legal practice, hardly any case has been handled with such a degree of
•openness.•
Hu Feng and most of the counterrevolutionaries
during the Anti-Rightist Campaign were tried secretly. At least
the people had been informed when and where the trial of Wei
would be conducted, and the crimes with which Wei was charged.
During the trial, five to seven hundred people were selected to
attend.
Dissidents and foreign reporters were allowed to wait
outside the court.
Finally, people could get some information
about the whole course of the trial and the verdict through television and other mass media. This was the first occasion that a
trial was conducted in public form in Communist China after the
Gang of Four.
c.

The Right to Defense

The Constitution offers the accused the right to defense.
During the trial, Wei was also provided with the chance to exercise this right. His efforts probably did not amount to •effective defense,• but, at least, it gave an impression of fairness.
Wei addresses his reply to the charges point by point. Wei
was of the opinion that the indictment of the Beijing procuratorate was untenable:
First, he made defense to the charge of supplying information to the foreigner. He said
that the information he had given to the foreigner was not so important that it would
affect the course and result of the war. On
one hand, he did not know and had not known
and had not been told what kinds of information ought to be kept in secret, on the other
hand, he had never seen any secret documents.
So Wei concluded that he had not cherished
the aim of betrayal7 he had not supplied any
information to his foreign friend7 and what
he had given to his foreign friend were not
state secrets or military secrets. Thus the
charge of betrayal was untenable.43
Second, he denied the charge of being
engaged in counterrevolutionary propaganda
and instigation.
He explored deeply the
actual meaning of •revolution• and •counterrevolution• in the refutation that what he
had
written
was
•counterrevolutionary.•
Rather the opposite, the idea of his articles
were •revolutionary.•44
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The third point concerned the slandering
of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought.
Wei said the Communist ideology he attacked
in the articles was the version practiced by
the Gang of Four and not pure MarxismLeninism and Mao Zedong thought.45
The fourth point Wei rebutted was the
charge of under the name of freedom of
speech, and the demand for democracy and human rights, instigating the overthrow of the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the
socialist system.
He pointed out that the
prosecutor had quoted and interpreted his
sentence of "feudalistic monarchy under a
socialist cloak• as a reference to the Gang
of Four; the half sentence of "not the modernized tools for satisfying the expansionist
ambitions of the dictators," was followed by
the sentence that "we demand the modern ization of the people's livelihood." The sentence could only become meaningful and complete when it was understood within its
context.46
The fifth point raised by Wei was similar to the fourth one.
Wei just wanted to
make clear that the Constitution had given
people the right to criticize the leadership
since they were not gods.
They (the Party
leadership) could minimize their mistakes
only under the people's supervision.
He
stated that in order to reform the system,
people had to be allowed to criticize and
discuss the defects of· the system.
But
criticisms were mostly not nice words, nor
could all be correct.
To demand all criticisms to be correct was equivalent to the
denial
of
freedom
of
criticism
and
expression. 47
d.

The Right to Appeal

Since there was no law of criminal procedure to refer to,
and no provisions had been written in the 1978 Constitution,
there was no legal authority granting the right to appeal.
Nevertheless, Wei was given the right to appeal:
If the accused is not convinced by this adjudication, he can appeal to the Beijing
Municipal Higher People's Court within ten
days after receiving the court verdict.48
Wei did make an appeal to the Beijing Municipal High People's
Court.
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The Court heard the appeal on November 6 lodged by Wei
against the judgment of the first instance made by the Beijing
Intermediate People's Court on OCtober 16, the indictment of the
public prosecutor and the defense by Wei and his advocate. After
an exchange between the defendant and the prosecutor, the Chief
Judge rejected the appeal by Wei and upheld the public trial
judgment:
the court ruled that Wei Jingsheng's appeal was
groundless and had to be rejected and the original sentence was
affirmed.49
The Trial of Wei -- Substance
The injustice of Wei's trial laid in the criminal charges.
The charge of betrayal seemed to be too harsh and there was no
evidence to support this charge. The charge of "instigating the
overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
socialist system" tended to be too politicized since the verdict
of criminal was derived from words (or speeches). Moreover, many
suspected that the trial was an act only, and concluded that the
sentence had already been decided before the trial.
Concerning the •crime of treason, • Wei was only an average
citizen. It is unlikely that he was privy to top secrets of the
state.
So what he knew about was no more than other people.
Thus even if it was improper to talk with foreigners about military affairs, this could not have been so serious as a crime of
•treason." Moreover, one may question whether the names of the
commanders and the number of Chinese troops, battle developments
and the number of casualties were "military secrets. •
There
was much news about the battle both in the mainland presses and
overseas. Accordingly, one of the elements of a counterrevolutionary crime is that it was carried out intentionally. In fact,
the court had not proven a motive of betraying the country when
Wei talked about the war with the foreigner. Moreover, the Court
should have considered whether one's behavior has endangered the
society.
From this perspective, the answer te·nded to be negative.
Furthermore, during the trial many important questions
were not mentioned and clarified:
for example, the source of
Wei's •military secrets,• to whom the information was supplied
and under what conditions.
Finally, it is interesting to note
that the foreigner to whom the secrets were allegedly supplied
was neither called to testify or identify. Thus the evidence was
not strong
enough
to
support a
term of fifteen
years
imprisonment.
The core of Wei's arrest and the sentence of guilty from the
beginning to the end, laid in his speeches and articles. Wei was
accused of writing and publishing reactionary articles and public
actions as a means to instigate the overthrow of the regime. The
Court cited many examples from his articles as evidence. Most of
them were interpreted and selected out of context (see examples
above). It was clear that Wei's speeches were so tough and radical that they transcended the tolerable range of Party leaders.
The Court seemingly meted out the sentence of counterrevolutionary simply because his speeches could not be tolerated by the
Party leaders.
Yet Wei only launched criticisms, and had not
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taken any reactionary actions.
The expression of opinions
contrary to the socialist system was not equivalent to conducting
subversive activities.
In fact, there were constant demands for
the abolition of "guilty derived from speech" in socialist law
since this contradicted free exercise of the freedom of speech as
protected by the Constitution. Wei's speeches might have had a
harmful effect on political and social unity and stability which
are indispensable for the modernization.
On that ground Wei
could be found guilty.
But still the degree of severity could
not justify the verdict of a counterrevolutionary crime.
The
impression that the Communist regime still adopts the unreasonable principle of "guilt derived from speeches and writings"
cannot be removed although Deng has claimed the abolition of such
a practice many times.
The trial of Wei was thus "pure formality" and "he was presumed to be guilty.nSO
Wei's trial illustrates that there has been an improvement
in the form of handling the cases in respect to socialist legality. That is, the whole case has been hand led according to the
provisions prescribed by the Constitution and laws. This tends
to be fairer than the practice in Mao's era.
One scholar commented that the form of the trial was close to the Western
model.Sl But the substance of the trial still was not free from
political influence.
The application of law under procedural
justice cannot be perfected unless the spirit and substance of
the trial are reconsidered and reformed.
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Chapter Siz
Institutionalization of the Legal System and Democratization
of the Political System: Limitations and Prospects
The hope for the rule of law and democratization of the
political system inspired by the slogan of "strengthening the
legal system and promoting democracy" since the Third Plenary
Session was quickly hampered by Deng's reassertation of the "Four
Fundamental Principles" in April 1979. Although the Party continues to encourage the emancipation of the mind and intellectual
freedom, and to urge the institutionalization and legalization of
democracy, the Party criticism of Bai Hua and the arrest and the
trial of Wei Jingsheng as well as other proponents of democracy
bring into question the commitment of .the Communist Party. The
core question is how far the legal system can be institutionalized and the political system will be democratized under the
"Four Fundamental Principles."
In fact, the criminal responsibility of intellectuals is a dependent variable of these two
tendencies. A basic understanding of the content of the "Four
Fundamental Principles• under Deng is deemed necessary before an
in-depth analysis can be offered.
A.

The Four Fundamental Principles under Deng

The reassertion of the "Four Fundamental Principles" has a
profound implication for the intellectuals. It is more or less a
reply to the outcry for freedom and democracy from the the intellectuals, especially from the younger intellectuals.
As Deng
expressed, "This time, I will concentrate on the criticism of the
'Rightist' ideological tendencies that cast doubt or rejection on
the Four Fundamental Principles•.! Thus this official announcement of upholding the "Four Fundamental Principles" in the Conference on the Party's Theoretical Work in April 1979 was intended to serve such purposes: to clarify the political attitude of
the Central Party leadership~ to defend the value as well as to
redefine the content of socialist principles and to set the
limits for relaxation of political restrictions.
1.

Socialist Road

In upholding the socialist road, Deng intends to rebute the
opinion that "socialism is inferior to capitalism. • He argued
that history has proved that •only socialism can save China" and
blames the backwardness of the economy, technology and culture of
socialist China on historical reasons and the Gang of Four. He
has defined the superiority of the socialist system vis-a-vis the
capitalist system by demonstrating that tremendous progress has
been made under socialism and the growth rate has surpassed that
of the capitalist countr ies.2 And most important of all, the
socialist system entails public ownership, which is to serve the
people's interest through a planned economy and centralized distribution. There is therefore no exploitation. Indeed, in order
to make prominent the merits of socialism, he has eliminated the
utopian and unrealistic elements and preserved the practical
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ones. Most notably, he has replaced the idea of egalitarianism
as advocated by the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution
by the more realistic idea of "to each according to his ability.•
He has also proposed that socialist economic construction must
proceed according to objective economic law.4
In sum, the
socialist road is the only direction of the Four Modernizations.
2.

Dictatorship of the Proletariat

Deng has emphasized the democratic aspect of dictatorship of
the proletariat which is said to be equated with socialist democracy, which is in his opinion the broadest and most practical
democracy in his tory for workers, peasants, and intellectuals. 5
He admits that the Party has failed to practice democracy. Yet
the Party has already begun to take measures to correct such mistakes and to strengthen inner-Party democracy and people's democracy.6 While affirming that socialist democracy is vital to
socialism and socialist modernization, he makes it explicit that
in order to suit reality, democratization must be put forward
gradually which is a function of the development of socialism.
The reason for the need of dictatorship by the Party, as explained by oeng, is the existence of counterrevolutionaries,
criminal offenders and other bad elements which will undermine
political and social stability.
According to Deng, this is a
special form of class struggle differed from the past which no
longer exists.? Deng cloaks the Party's dictatorship in terms of
an essential element in developing socialism and democracy, and
protecting socialist construction.
3.

Leadership of the Party

Deng has claimed that it is impossible to have a dictatorship of the proletariat, or socialist revolution and socialist
construction without Party leadership.
The birth of a new
socialist China is a concrete example. Accordingly, the Party is
an indispensable organizer and leader for socialist modern ization. 8 There fore, in his mind, democracy can only be promoted
under Party leadership, otherwise anarchism and political chaos
will result.
Deng has expressed that he considers to correct
Party leadership which can be achieved by the adoption of measures to strengthen Party discipline, to promote inner-party democracy and people's democracy, to accept people's supervision,
to eliminate corruptive practices as well as to raise the educational standards of the cadres and Party members.
4.

Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedonq Thought

Deng holds firmly that Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
thought will continue to be the guiding ideology of the PRC. The
Party must consistently adhere to Mao's thought since it is the
application and development of Marxism-Leninism in China.
Yet,
he warns that distinction must be made between Mao Zedong thought
and Mao's mistakes.9 He also deletes all the radical and revolutionary romantic ideas from Mao's thought: continuing revolution
under the dictatorhsip of the proletariat, political campaigns as
well as the slogan of "Revolution is Justifiable. •
He upholds
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mostly the practical aspects of Mao's thought which serve the
need of socialist modernization, stability and unity. He adopts
Lenin's proverb:
talk more about economics and less about
politics.1.0 His attitude towards Mao's thought is reflected in
his later policy line:
the ideological line of preceding from
reality and seeking truth from facts, the concept of shifting the
focus to economic construction in light of China's reality, the
principle of establishing a political system with a high degree
of socialist democracy, the policy of developing socialist education, science and culture, and the principle of. "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend."
In short, in Deng's conception, Communist-led modernization must
be guided by Communist thought.
B.

Institutionalization of the Legal Systems

To institutionalize China's legal system is to formalize its
structure and the procedures of the legal processes. This necessitates the establishment of a formal detailed and written set of
rules with a
well-institutionalized political organization
capable of enforcing the compliance with these rules, to resolve
ambiguities and to settle disputes effectively through procedural
regularity.
Most important of all, as a means to resolve conflicts and protect people's rights and freedoms, the law must be
supreme vis-a-vis Party policy and the legal system must obtain
an absolute degree of autonomy -- that is, judicial independence
-- and must be free from the control or influence of other
political organizations. Only under this setting can the legal
system offer legal protection to the intellectuals and achieve
stability, credibility and predictability. Also the universality
and impartiality in the application of law can then be
guaranteed.
The pragmatic leaders have already realized the necessity of
instituting
a
socialist
legal
system
that
stressed
institutionalization and legalization as reflected in the Communique of the Third Plenary Session. Yet the only obstacle for
independence of justice comes from the leadership of the Party
which is the core of the "Four Fundamental Principles"·
The socialist system is basically the instrument of dictatorship of the Party.
This is a concrete principle in Communist China. Thus the Party leadership over the legal system is
undoubted.ll
The
1982
Constitution
ensured
"judicial
independence":
The People's court shall in accordance with
the law exercise power independently and will
not be subject to interference by administrative organs, public organization or individuals.
(Article 126)
However, the Party still retains its ideological and political
leadership, personnel management and most of all, the Party acts
as the supervisor of the legal system in law enforcement.l2
Judicial independence is fragile, based on this relationship
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between the People's courts and Party, since the "leadership of
the Party" is confirmed by the Constitution. Moreover, the judicial independence in the communist regime only takes the form of
"the People's courts administering justice independently, subject
only to the law." It is different from the Western practice of
"judges administering justice independently, subject to no interference except by the law." In essence, "independent administration of justice" only means an exemption from extra-Party influence.l3 This arrangement has provided the cleavage to Party
leadership within the judicial system.
In fact, the realization
of judicial independence depends to a great degree on the goodwill and the legal values of the Party.
The lack of respect for law was the main reason for the collapse of the legal system in Mao's era. If the sense of legality
of the Party leaders and cadres is not strengthened, the legal
system will never be an adequate mean to uphold justice and
guarantee independent judicature. The spirit of the rule of law
that "all are equal before the law" will never be achieved. In
the past years, occasions of violating legal practice and procedures do have occurred.
For example, the dissident Liu Qing
was convicted and assigned three years of "labour reform" by the
Beijing Public Security in July 1979.14 This practice violated
the law since the accused must be tried and the verdict must be
made by the courts.
Another example is that in October 1980, Chairman Hua
Guofeng in telling the reporters in almost the same breath that
the Gang of Four would be tried, and that they would not be sentenced "to death." In other words, Hua already knew the verdict
before the trial.
This leads to a very serious question of
whether the court acts according to the law or the will of the
Party leaders -- a concrete case of Party intervention in the
administration of justice by the courts.
Indeed many prominent
scholars in law still ascribe to "Party control over the legal
system. •15
Still the endeavors to improve the legal system cannot be
denied. First, the institutionalization of the "independence of
justice" has shown the Party's determination to disengage itself
from involvement in routine judicial works.
Moreover, the 1982
Party Constitution clearly defined the scope of Party leadership:
Party leadership consists mainly in political,
ideological and organizational leadership.
The Party must formulate and implement correct
lines, principles and policies, do its organizational, propaganda and education work
well. • • • It must see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of
the state and the economic, cultura 1 and people's organizations work in actuality with
initiative, independently, responsibly and in
harmony.
(Preamble)
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Second, the supremacy of law has been affirmed.
Zhang Youyu
stressed that the law is above the Party Committee or any individual. Once the law is put into effect, everybody will have to
observe it.l6 Thus it is said that abiding by the law means submitting to Party leadership. The revised (1982) Party Constitution prescribed that "from the central to the grass-roots level,
all the activities of Party organization, and Party members cannot be contravened the state Constitution and law." This intention manifested itself in the adoption of the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution by the CPC:
This Constitution is the fundamental law of
the state and has supreme legal authority.
The people of all nationalities, all state
organs,
the armed
forces,
all political
parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings in the country must
take the Constitution as the basic norm of
conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the
dignity of the Constitution and ensure its
implementation.
(Preamble)
In short, the implementation of an independent administration of justice and the confirmation of the supremacy of law are
crucial steps toward the strengthening of the legal system of
communist China. These may pave the road to perfecting the legal
protection of people's political rights and civil liberties as
written into the Constitution and to promote legal justice in the
application of law.

c.

Democratization of the Political System

After thirty years of Communist rule, China remains in a
state of backwardness and poverty.
The people, especially the
younger intellectuals, have begun to suspect the superiority of
socialism as claimed and propagated by the Communists. The ten
years of turmoil have greatly shaken their confidence in
socialism and the leadership of the CPC. For those who are optimistic, they see the need to look for other alternatives to
modernize China.
They have looked to the Western advanced
countries as a model for development. Those who cherish no illusions about Communism have become cynical. This atmosphere cultivates a tendency for what the Chinese Communists call "bourgeois liberalism.•
"The Four Fundamental Principles• are aimed against this
tendency. According to Hu Qiaomu, the •bourgeois liberalization
tendency• is characterized by •publicizing and advocating bourgeois freedoms, calling for the adoption of the bourgeois parliamentarism, including the two-party system, campaigning for
office, bourgeois freedom of speech, press, assembly and association, bourgeois individualism and even anarchism to a certain
extent.•l7 •tts advocates also promote the bourgeois profit mentality and behavior, the bourgeois way of life, vulgar tastes and
standard of morality, and bourgeois arts."l8 The essence of this
bourgeois
ideological
tendency
lies
in
•consc iously
and
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unconsciously demanding China to forsake the socialist road and
install the so-called capitalist liberal system in the political,
economic, social and cultural arena. •19
Most importantly, as
explained by Deng, the core of the bourgeois liberalization is
•opposition to Party leadership.•
The insistence on the socialist road is a reply to those who
cherish the idea of transplanting socialism with capitalist ways
of development.
Deng has attributed past failures to the inexperience of the Party in the practice of socialism and mostly to
the Gang of Four. As the Party has now realized and rectified
its past mistakes, the Four Modernizations along the lines of the
socialist road offer a greater possibility for the achievement of
a strong China.
In the discussion of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
Deng has expressed his understanding of the value of democracy.
In saying this, he hopes that the intellectuals and the democratic elements will be more patient and moderate toward democratizaton which can only be gradually achieved as socialism advances.
His viewpoint is just the opposite of the dissidents as represented by Wei.
Wei treats democratization as the pre-requisite
for the success of the Four Modern i:z:ations. Moreover, the conception of democracy of Deng on the one hand, and Wei on the
other hand are quite different. What Deng supports is socialist
democracy, a directive democracy, that is, democratic centralism:
Democracy and centralism are
inseparable.
Under socialism, centralism on a democratic
basis alone conforms with the interests of the
state and the people; and only democracy under
the guidance of such centralism is socialist
in nature.
If and when there is centralism
without democracy, then it is bureaucratic
centralism; on the other hand, if an democracy
without centralism, then will lead to ultrademocracy and anarchism, which does not conform with the interests of the people.20
Thus Deng's conception is a constructivist one: democracy ought
to be promoted under the guidance of centralism in order to prevent political and social chaos. For him, democracy is a means
of unleashing fully the initiative and creativity of the intellectuals, contributing to the socialist modernization, and
achieving political stability and social unity.
In fact,
socialist democracy is based on collectivity. Thus, it is the
antitesis of Western democracy, which stresses individualism. On
the contrary, Wei believes in •spontaneous order,• so he rejects
the notion that democracy ought to be carried out under the
guidance of centralism or Party leadership. He regards each individual as possession the right to decide his own destiny which
is not to be affected by collective interest. To Wei, democracy
is the end rather than the means. Be emphasizes that the people
ought to have the rights to elect, supervise and recall their
government. The democratization of the political system towards
this direction is exactly what most of the democratic elements,
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notably Wang Xizhe have demanded.
But this goes against the
Party leadership which is absolute within the communist regime.
Concerning the class struggle, Deng has clearly maintained that
the anti-feudalistic and anti-bourgeois struggle will continue to
exist in the ideological sphere in the socialist society.
The
target of this "special form" of class struggle is obviously the
dem:>cratic elements who advocate "capitalist liberlization and
dem:>cratization as well as those intellectuals who look for
'bourgeois' freedom".
The greatest force against dem:>cratization is perhaps the
insistence on the principle of the leadership of the Communist
Party which is an all-encompassing one.
This has revealed the
hope for a Western type of political system -- that is, a twoparty or multi-party system -- to be an illusion.
Under this
principle, it becomes meaningless for the people to be "the real
masters of the state, society and enterprises, taking a direct
part in making decisions in all fields" since the status of the
Party is above the state. The Communist Party entrusts itself
with the lofty mission of liberating all mankind, and its leadership is beyond challenge. It is said that "the Chinese Communist
Party is capable of discovering and correcting its mistakes. n21
This implies, or even rejects, the redundancy of popular supervision over the Party. It is a very dangerous claim since it affirms the fully autonomous nature of the Party, the discipline of
which highly depends on self-control. Thus, Party supremacy is
the greatest enemy of democratization.
Party leadership also extends to the socio-political and
ideological sphere:
the line that Marxism-Leninism is in the
leading and guiding position must be carried out~ and the line
that Party leadership in political ideology must be insisted.22
Thus, the principle of "Two Hundred" cannot be understood as a
detachment from Party leadership.
The Party has the right to
intervene into what is going to be publicized and published.
Moreover, Party leadership in literature and the art is said to
be vital to help the literature and art to develop along the line
of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. The spirit and essence of Mao Zedong's "Talk At the Yenan Forum on Literature and
Art• as the guiding ideolqqy for Chinese literature and art has
been reaffirmed recently.2r In fact, the emancipation of the
mind does not mean the denial of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong
Thought, but rather:
It means, in the first place, that our cadres
and people should free themselves from the
shackles of the 'Cultural Revolution' and the
'Leftist' errors of the preceding period as
well as from fetters of the personality cult
and dogmatism, return to the right track of
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, and
uphold the fine tradition of seeking truth
from facts.24
The present position of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought
in the intellectual and ideological spheres is quite clear.
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Thus, the hope for releasing the intellectua: world from the yoke
of orthodox thinking seems to be no more than wishful thinking.
Yet since Deng has eliminated many idealistic and revolutionary radical elements from Mao's concept of the "Four Fundamental Principles, • and his policies are far less dictatorial
than Mao's, there is still much room for intellectual freedom and
deoocratization of the political system.
Moreover, since the
role of the in te llec tuals has become more important as the
socialist modernization program proceeds, a substantial degree of
liberalization and deoocratization is inevitable.
Indeed, the
Communique of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the CPC has already specified that:
The Plenary Session holds that is it our
Party's unswerving policy to carry forward
socialist deoocracy and perfect the socialist
legal system, and to guarantee that the masses
have the full right and opportunity to express
their views on state affairs and raise suggestions to and criticize Party and government
leaders.25
The 1982 Constitution later stipulated that the establishment of
a socialist legal system based on socialist deoocracy is one of
the chief goals of Communist China:
Under the leadership of the Communist Party of
China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and
Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all
nationalities will continue to adhere to the
people's deoocratic dictatorship and follow
the socialist road, steadily improve socialist
institutions,
develop socialist deoocracy,
improve the socialist legal system and work
hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry,
agriculture, national defend and since and
technology step by step to turn China in to a
Socialist country with a high level of culture
and deoocracy. (Preamble)
In the final analysis, deoocratization, the rule of law, all
sorts of freedoms and political rights, as well as criticisms
cannot transcend and must develop within the limits of the "Four
Fundamental Principles.•
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Cbapter Seven
Conclusion
This comparative study clearly indicates that both Mao and
Deng have just constructed legal systems to suit their own needs.
The legal system is a tool for achieving Party goals as defined
by the leaders only.
The comparative case studies of the
criminal responsibility of the intellectuals provide a good illustration.
Indeed the legal frame of the Party leaders is the
chief determinant of criminal responsibility. Yet at the macro
level, Communist ideology as interpreted by Mao and Deng has
determined the working principles of the legal system.
First,
their different understanding of the states of political development determine the nature and form of class struggle. For Mao,
the class struggle is a persistent and constant phenomenon unrestricted by legal constraints. Deng believes that class struggle has basically come to an end, and, therefore, all contradictions ought to be handled in accordance with prescribed legal
procedures.
Second, their different conceptions of socialist
construction determine the role of the legal system: while Mao
adopted the strategy of permanent revolution in which revolutionary justice played the role of eliminating class enemies, Deng
realizes that socialist modernization is only possible in an orderly environment in which procedural justice maintains order.
These ideo1ogical differences have differentiated the revolutionary justice system from the procedural justice system.
In light of the comparative case studies, several conclusions can be summarized:
(l) The legal system, that is, the procedural judicial system that Deng aims to establish is fundamentally different from
Mao's revolutionary judicial system both in form and content.
(2) The working principles of the legal system have a direct impact on justice in the administration of law.
(3)
The legal treatment of the intellectuals, to a large
extent, is affected by the attitudes and policies of the Party
leaders towards the intellectuals.
(4) The degree of criminal responsibility of the intellectuals is much higher under the revolutionary justice than under
procedural justice.
(5) In reacting to the demands for freedom and democratization from the intellectuals, the procedural justice system has
provided a certain degree of legal protection whereas the revolutionary justice system has no room for such protection.
(6)
In handling these demands in the sense that they surpass the tolerable range of the Communist leaders, Mao, in the
revolutionary justice system, took extra-legal means and politicized the issues, whereas Deng, within the procedural justice
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system, tends to adhere more to the procedures prescribed by the
Constitution and law.
(7)
The legal protection and the degree of criminal
liability of the intellectuals highly depends on the democratic
and legal values of the Party leaders.
(8)
In the light of (3), the legal system in Communist
China is subordinate to the Party leaders' own ideological and
legal framework.
(9) The perfection of the procedural justice can be assessed by the criminal responsibility of the intellectuals who have
been the group most discriminated against in Communist China.
( 10)
The Communist ideology as represented by the "Four
Fundamental Principles" under Deng is the chief obstacle for the
full play of procedural justice.
Concerning the first point, the orientation of Mao was to
treat the legal system as a weapon of class struggle, both physical and spiritual, whereas Deng takes it as an indispensable institution for maintaining order.
Mao de-emphasized the structural aspect of the legal system, but Deng stresses its institutionalization. For Mao, the content of the legal system was
to be determined by the Party policy. For Deng, the content of
the legal system is the supremacy of law.
Class nature is of
less significance. In short, the legal essence of Deng's ideology is far much stronger than Mao's ideology.
Mao's bias against the intellectuals rendered revolutionary
justice unable to offer any legal protection to the intellectuals. Every demand or criticism from the intellectuals had been
treated as challenge to the authority of the regime and the
leadership of the Party and as a form of manifestation of "reactionary.• Deng is more willing to make concessions to the intellectuals' demands and this has reduced the criminal liability of
the intellectuals.
Even a certain degree of guarantee is offered. For example, the 1982 Constitution provides that the intellectuals are no longer the "opposition force" and that "all
are equal before the law.•
Since the leadership of the Communist Party is the inalterable ruling principle in Communist China, the core of which is
the leadership of a single leader or a committee, the legal system is inevitably constructed to facilitate the fulfillment of
the goals of Party leaders. As a whole, the orientation, form
and content of the legal system are determined by the Party
leaders.
In conclusion, this study has shown that the procedural
judicial system is superior to a revolutionary judicial system.
This is true not only in the sense that the former can offer certain legal protection to the intellectuals, but also in that the
pursuit of procedural justice marks an end to the revolutionary
era and the system is evolutionary in nature. Evolutionary here
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means that the system can be perfected through a series of steps
gradually, most notably in the enactment of new laws and the professionalization of the system. But the procedural judicial system is still in its preliminary stage of development and has inherited some legacies from the revolutionary judicial system.
For example, the system has not yet been completely depoliticized
and institutionalized. Moreover, the legal system cannot be improved drastically unless the regime puts an end to all forms of
class struggle, including special forms as asserted by Deng. The
existence of classes under dictatorship means that certain strata
would be discriminated against and be treated unequally since
they are said to be excluded from the category of the "people."
This contradicts the principle that procedural justice is applied
to all. In this case, the degree of criminal responsibility of
the intellectuals is still uncertain. This can be illustrated by
the criticism of Bai Hua and the arrest and trial of democratic
dissents as well as the arbitrary sentence of Liu Qing.
As a
whole, this study has demonstrated that the criminal responsibility of the intellectuals is a function of: (1)
the degree
of the monolithic rule demanded by the Party leader; and (2) the
legal protection that can be offered by the legal system. The
interrelationship can best be represented by the following
formula:
CR

=f

(M)

CL:

Criminal Responsibility

LP
M:
LP:

Degree of Monolithic Rule
Legal Protection

Since the ultimate goal is to establish a socialist legal
system on the basis of socialist democracy which is the highest
form of procedural justice, that is, the socialist rule of law,
the prospect for its achievement depends on two factors.
The
first one is the cultivation of a legal tradition among the people, cadres and Party leaders within the Communist regime. Only
with a strong sense of legality and the establishment of a good
legal tradition can the rule of law become possible. The other
factor is the democratization of the regime -- that is, the institutionalization and legalization of socialist democracy. Too
much emphasis on centralism would only be at the expense of democracy. The fulfillment of these two requirements would pave
the way for the socialist rule of law. One hopes that when the
socialist rule of law is achieved, the criminal responsibility of
the intellectuals will be reduced drastically. Though procedural
justice under Deng is moving in that direction, yet there is little cause for optimism since Communist ideology possesses strong
inherent dictatorial and anti-democratic tendencies.
In short,
the strict obsevance of law by all would undermine the Party's
supremacy on which the whole Communist system rests.
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